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DEMOCRACY AND 
ENGA POLITICAL 
CULTURE
PHILIP GIBBS
Enga is one of 20 provinces of Papua New 
Guinea. In this highlands province, during the 
recent 2002 elections there were 17 candidates 
for the provincial seat (covering the entire 
province) and 137 candidates for the five open 
seats. There were also 2180 candidates for 
the 327 local council wards. Many of the 43 
registered political parties endorsed candidates. 
In this paper I focus on the national parliament 
contest. 
The elections did not go well. It is an 
understatement to say that the common roll 
was “imperfect” (Post-Courier 6 June, 2002, 
p.1), or that the elections were “deficient” 
(Commonwealth Expert Group on Papua New 
Guinea’s Electoral Arrangements, 2002). 
Electoral Commission funds were short (Post-
Courier 11 June, 2002, p.1) and in many places 
polls were in turmoil. The Prime Minister 
himself, after waiting nearly five hours to cast 
his vote, said: “This is more than a bungle. 
Someone should be hung for this” (Post-Courier, 
18 June, 2002, p.1). Political commentator, 
Sir Anthony Siaguru, described the national 
election as a “debacle” and a “travesty” 
and said that the country needs to ask 
whether “the electoral process has been so 
seriously compromised because of a combination 
of disenfranchisement and manipulation that 
democracy in Papua New Guinea has been put 
at risk” (Post-Courier 28 June, 2002, p.11).
The plan for Enga Province was to have one-
day voting on the Tuesday 25 June. This did 
not happen due to various factors, including the 
non-availability of ballot papers. The elections 
began a week later and were drawn out for 
two weeks in a drama involving hijacked ballot 
boxes, the bombing of voting papers beside the 
Wabag Police station and fatal shootings at one 
polling place (National 12-14 July 2002, pp 1-2; 
Independent 1 August 2002, p.2).
To what degree were the elections 
democratic? Democratic elections call for real 
competition between candidates, a choice 
between candidates and parties, freedom for 
people to consider alternative policies and a 
degree of confidentiality for voters’ choices. 
Dr Henry Okole in a commentary entitled 
“Democracy, Demo-crazy, or Demon-cracy?” 
questions whether competition, political 
participation and civil/political liberties were 
in fact present and whether “PNG is only 
masquerading as a democracy” (National, 1 
October, 2002, p.13). 
Results in Enga were declared as follows:
There were court challenges to all the 
results. Most were dropped or dismissed, but 
in November 2003, almost a year and a half 
later, court challenges for Wapenamanda and 
Kompiam-Ambumu are still unresolved. The 
challenge by the former sitting member Daniel 
Kapi against Samuel Tei Abel for Wabag has 
been upheld, but the dispute is still to be 
settled through the Supreme Court. Thus people 
in Wabag are not officially represented in 
parliament.
This paper seeks to shed light on what 
happened in the Central area near the 
provincial capital Wabag. I look at factors that 
impact on international standards of democracy 
and ask if “home-grown” Enga forms of political 
choice are emerging. One political scientist has 
noted evidence in the nearby Simbu Province, 
of “village or clan consensus based voting” 
(Standish 2002b:5). This study tries to ascertain 
the degree to which clan consensus based voting 
was present in Central Enga, and its strengths 
and weaknesses for promoting democracy 
in the Enga political process. The study is 
based on personal observation, discussions 
with election officials and other people, and 
two questionnaires administered to people in 
the lower Ambumu Valley, near Wabag (see 
Appendix). To preserve confidentiality, people’s 
names are often represented by A,B.C … N, M; 
clans by α,β,χ, and places by X, Y, Z.1
Electorate   Candidate  Party      votes % of vote
Enga Provincial     Peter Ipatas   PDM        123313 38.9%
Wabag Open   Samuel Tei Abal  PDM      11413 24.7%
Wapenamanda Open  Yangakun Miki Kaeok PLP      16381 23.6%
Kompiam-Ambumu Open  Dickson Masa Maki Indep.      7178 23.3%
Kandep Open   Don Pomb Pullie Polye NA      13599 36.4% 
Lagaip-Porgera Open  Yarka Kappa  Indep.       12720 9.5%
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of the car holding a high powered gun 
and gave commands to crowds on the 
road to move to their respective polling 
areas and to leave the road and market 
areas empty. He then set off in the 
direction of Wabag.
I continued walking fast and encountered 
a police van full of policemen. Not long 
after, more police cars arrived followed by 
several other cars. Two ballot boxes were 
taken down from the car and brought to 
the polling area. I asked a young boy in 
one of the cars for the ballot boxes for my 
rest house. The young boy pointed to a 
truck with two boxes and nobody at the 
back of the truck. I jumped onto the truck 
and decided to turn back with the ballot 
REALITIES IN THE 2002 ELECTIONS
Here is an account from an Enga participant 
in the 2002 elections. 
This morning at 5.30AM, I was awakened 
by sounds of cars and shouts from nearby 
houses. People were relaying the message 
from village to village that cars were 
bringing ballot boxes to polling areas. 
Five minutes later I heard two gun shots 
from A’s place. Then there was silence.
I went to the main road and met people 
going to polling areas to cast their votes. 
I walked along the road and while doing 
so heard a car coming at high speed. It 
stopped and B (a candidate) jumped out 
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boxes to my polling area. Five minutes 
later, I heard gun shots coming from X.
The cars did not move and the policemen 
whispered among themselves. I asked a 
policeman and he said they needed more 
security along the road to Y rest house. 
They feared C (a candidate) on the road 
to that polling area because there was 
tension between him and B (another 
candidate). They knew that the candidate 
would be on the road waiting for them. D 
(a candidate) came out of a tinted glass 
car with a pistol in his hand and looked 
around and gave a command for the cars 
to move. We went for about a half a 
kilometre and the truck stopped at the 
back of two police cars. The ballot boxes 
for my rest house were shifted to the 
police car with an open back. I also 
jumped onto that police car.
Approaching my polling area, I was asked 
by the a clan men on the car to take 
the ballot boxes to their area. I argued 
with them. I told them that my people 
must cast their votes using their freedom. 
When we reached the polling area, I 
told the driver to stop and brought the 
boxes to the polling area. E, a reserve 
policeman, helped me in the argument.
The tables were set for the polling to 
begin and the presiding ofﬁcer gave an 
introduction to the crowd. Before the 
ﬁrst person was called by the polling 
ofﬁcials to cast his vote, F, an intending 
candidate suggested that “the table 
be turned down”, meaning that he 
would withdraw from contesting, and 
in exchange, everyone should give their 
votes to G (another candidate). The 
people refused, so F told his clansmen 
that he was still contesting and that they 
should give their votes to him.
When it came to voting I did not 
feel free, particularly for the vote for 
Councillor. This was because, there were 
three candidates for the Council seat who 
are very close friends of mine. One has 
worked with me and another is a relative. 
I would feel guilty if I gave my vote to 
one, and not the other two. Each of them 
thought that I would vote for them. My 
mind was not working properly now so I 
decided to leave. 
I went and passed by the Y polling area. 
My name is in the roll book there too, 
so I knew I could cast my vote there as 
well if I wanted to. As I waited to hear 
my name called I noticed that names of 
small children under 16 years were on 
the common roll book. I was surprised to 
hear H’s 9 year old daughter was called 
and her mother went to cast the vote 
on the child’s behalf. I saw many others 
doing the same thing. I also noticed that 
only one person would go back and forth 
several times to cast votes when names 
of persons of a sub-clan were called. The 
persons whose names were called were 
nearby but they let others do it for them. 
Many issues are raised in the this account:
•  After many days of delay, people in 
Enga didn’t know when the polling would 
begin until it happened.
•  Guns (including those held by 
candidates) were part of the scene.
•  Police were intimidated
•  Even with a police escort, ballot boxes 
could be taken to sites other than those 
assigned.
•  “Turning the table” (everyone voting 
for only one candidate) was presented 
as an option, but the people in this case 
refused.
•  The person giving the account did 
not feel free when it came to casting his 
or her ballot (there was no secrecy) – a 
common experience.
•  Multiple voting was quite possible 
since his or her name was on the roll in 
different polling places and applying an 
ink mark to the voter’s ﬁnger was not 
practised in most of Enga (and the ink 
can be taken off with bleach). 
•  Some people let others vote in their 
name. 
•  There were many under-age people 
with names on the common roll.
THE COMMON ROLL
There were 405,804 persons on the common 
roll for Enga province. The Electoral Office in 
Wabag received 473,000 voting papers. 406,831 
papers were sent out to voting officials in the 
five electoral districts.2 An electoral officer has 
noted very few unused ballot papers returned 
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from polling places throughout Enga. If this is 
true, then what happened with the papers that 
were left over? Some were burned but (as this 
paper will show) many remaining ballot papers 
were simply filled in and deposited in the polling 
boxes by candidates or their supporters.3
Electorate  Number on common roll
Wapenamanda    77,735
Kompiam-Ambumu  73,581
Kandepe     48,362
Wabag     70,053
Lagaip-Porgera    136,073
Total      405,804
 
Table 1: Number of Persons on the Common Roll in 
the Enga Province
By contrast, according to the National 
Electoral Commission reports on the 
Commission’s website, there were 317,213 
papers “allowed” (i.e. counted) for the 
provincial seat and 317,602 papers for the open 
seats. The 89,000 difference is, mainly due to 
the destruction and loss of ballot papers or ballot 
boxes.
According to the year 2000 census, however, 
there are 295,031 people in Enga Province. The 
legal voting age is 18, so about 55% of the 
population, or 162,000 people would be eligible 
to vote. The huge difference between those 
eligible to vote according to the census figures 
and the votes actually cast was noted in an 
article by Daniel Korimbao in the National 
entitled, “More ballots in Enga than total 
population.” 
In a province where thousands of ballot 
papers were firebombed, and where candidates 
complained of some of their people not voting 
at all due to the shortness of the voting period 
(one day polling), this is an amazing result.” 
317,213 ballot papers were counted for the 
provincial seat, in a province which, according 
to the 2000 census figures has a total population 
of 295,031 people: men, women and children 
(National, 30 July, 2002, p.2). 
These results raise a number of questions. 
How could the common roll be inflated by 
150%? How could the number of votes cast 
be inflated by 90%? Why did the Electoral 
Commission dispatch so many ballot papers? 
Was it simply because the common roll was 
inflated or were there other factors? It appears 
that the election results were predetermined to 
a large extent by the number of ballot papers 
distributed rather than the number of people 
eligible to vote. 
CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES
Intending candidates try to attract votes 
using various strategies:
•  establishing and maintaining a “base 
vote” with their own clansmen and 
women;
•  establishing and exploiting tribal 
alliances through blood, marriage and 
trade links;
•  establishing strategic alliances with 
other candidates and seeking to limit 
access to one’s base area by other 
candidates;
•  attracting voters from other areas 
through rallies and speeches;
•  attracting voters, particularly those 
from areas outside one’s base vote area 
through handouts: motor vehicles, money 
and sometimes cheques. 
Intending candidates need the support of 
their own clan and hopefully the neighbouring 
clans that would normally support their group 
in exchange or warfare. This was easier to 
accomplish in the past and is still the case in 
more remote areas where “goods and services” 
are harder to come by. In areas where tribal 
fighting is common, whole clans look for means 
to create allies who have more young warriors, 
especially those who possess high powered 
firearms. Clans, particularly those without their 
own candidate, see elections as a chance to 
exchange votes with other clans who have 
more members employed in the public and 
private sectors. In some cases election alliances 
overshadow the traditional alliances maintained 
through intermarriage and pig exchange. 
Clan unity is important, but not easy to 
maintain when people live along the main 
highway and have easier access to services. 
There, people have more freedom to decide for 
themselves and the clan has less influence over 
its members. For example, if fighting erupts, 
people living near the highway can more easily 
escape and seek refuge in other places, or if one 
is sick, close relatives can arrange transport to 
hospital. If there is more than one candidate 
from a clan, that is a sign of serious division and 
probable election defeat, with the likelihood of 
recrimination and even warfare.
Within the Sambeoko clan at Par in the 
lower Ambumu Valley, the Laikini sub-clan 
had two members standing for the open seat: 
Norbert Tanda and Titus Mendai. People had 
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tried to point out how self-defeating it was to 
try to establish a base vote with two candidates 
from the same sub-clan, but neither would give 
way. Norbert Tanda and his supporters supported 
John Pundari for the Provincial seat, partly 
because Norbert’s mother is from Waialuni, 
Pundari’s mother’s clan. Furthermore, Pundari 
had given Norbert a job. Titus supported the 
sitting member Peter Ipatasa for the Provincial 
seat, partly to be different from Tanda, but also 
because he is from a section of the Sambeoko 
clan who live close to Ipatasa’s home territory, 
Irelya. Titus is a high school headmaster and 
many people in education support Ipatasa 
because of his past free education policy. 
Another incentive for some of the Ipiamuni 
sub-clan of Sambeoko to support Ipatasa was 
because Governor Ipatasa had given one of their 
members money to publish a book. The polling 
for the Sambeoko clan at Par ended in disaster 
with two men killed on polling day and a tribal 
fight which lasted four months, with sixteen 
people killed and many injured. 
The situation at Irelya also presented a base 
vote problem for Peter Ipatasa, with himself 
and rival Kundpen Talyaga being from the 
same Apulini tribe.4 However, Ipatasa got the 
upper hand when the Sikita clan of Kundapen 
voted first. This gave the advantage to Ipatasa’s 
Talyulu clan because when time came for them 
to vote it was late in the afternoon and Ipatasa 
and his supporters ended up with the remaining 
voting papers. 
Having established a base vote, a candidate 
must maintain it. John Pundari had difficulty 
in maintaining the base vote he had in 1997 
in the Yampu area of the Lower Ambumu. The 
Aiyele clan had expected some sort of project 
from Pundari, since his grandmother is from 
their clan. A group of men travelled to Moresby 
before the election to ask Pundari for money or 
second-hand cars. They returned empty-handed 
and in retaliation they called Wambupi, their 
main meeting place, “Namba tu Irelya” (second 
Irelya - Irelya being Peter Ipatasa’s home). This 
was a clear indication that they would be 
giving their support to Ipatasa. Ipatasa seized the 
chance and came and gave a panda pingi (initial 
payment to initiate an exchange of valuables) to 
Siki Pyatoe because some of Ipatasa’s supporters 
had injured Siki in a stone-throwing incident 
near Irelya. Thus Ipatasa managed to establish 
some support in what was formerly a base vote 
area for Pundari. 
Some candidates see the elections as an 
opportunity to establish alliances with former 
enemies. Consider the case of the Laita and 
Sambeoko clans in the Lower Ambumu.  Most 
members of the Laita clan voted for Norbert 
Tanda for the open seat, and Pundari for the 
Regional seat. This was because many of the 
Laita clan are members of the SDA church, 
so they voted for their fellow church member, 
Pundari. In the vote for Kompiam-Ambumu 
Open, the Laita clan took the chance to heal 
relations with Tanda’s Sambeoko clan. In the 
late 1980s, the Laita clan had killed nine men 
from Sambeoko and lost five men themselves. 
Compensation had not been satisfactory for 
both parties. Secondary payments were required 
to establish a permanent peace settlement, so 
they saw the election as an opportunity for this. 
Their voting for Tanda was like compensation 
to help establish peace with the Sambeoko clan. 
Unfortunately, it has promoted an escalation in 
post-election fighting because, as noted above, 
after two men were killed at Par on polling day, 
most of the Sambeoko clan and the Laita clan 
are united in an election-related tribal fight 
against the Depau clan and their supporters.
Another strategy is to use decoy candidates to 
split the vote of a rival. For example, candidates 
for the Provincial seat may endorse candidates for 
the open seats. If there is a popular candidate 
for the Open seat campaigning also for one’s 
opponent in the race for the Provincial seat, 
then one might endorse a candidate in the 
neighbouring clan to be the candidate for the 
open seat in order to reduce that candidate’s 
influence. The decoy candidate may not stand 
a chance of winning, but by splitting the vote 
and acquiring votes for his sponsoring Provincial 
candidate he is assured of favours if the Provincial 
candidate should win. The case of Norbert Tanda 
could be an example of a decoy candidate luring 
the Sambeoko clan votes away from Ipatasa, who 
appeared to be getting more support from the 
Sambeoko clan in recent times. Rumours abound 
of candidates being bribed by other candidates so 
as to bring discord (yama nuu mandenge – literally, 
carrying an evil spirit). During his campaign, 
referring to such decoy candidates, Peter Ipatasa 
often warned people of tricksters and secret 
plotters in their midst (waa katengipi, yama nuu 
mandenge dupame kapapao ita naminatami).
Rallies and campaign speeches are another 
part of campaign strategy. In responses to the 
questionnaire we found that:
•  all except one of the respondents had 
listened to political speeches. 
•  28/33 said they found them 
“interesting”.
•  26/33 said they found them 
“convincing”.
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the time. Also, if you vote Pundari into 
the parliament, the whole nation will 
thank Enga for that. The nation indeed is 
thirsting for good leadership.
Five years in parliament is like ﬁve 
months. Those who enter with a black 
beard will be still the same by 2007 
national election. Please, I ask you now to 
vote Mr. Pundari this time. If God does 
not bless Pundari’s hands to improve the 
standard of our living in Enga and the 
sun does not shine or if nothing happens 
then you can vote me out in the 2007 
national election. Try Mr. Pundari now by 
casting your pure vote. This is the golden 
opportunity for the people of Enga. Your 
one second decision will make differences 
for the province and the nation.6
Pundari likes to promote his clean church-
goer image. Nevertheless, he saw fit to give 
out cheques to village youth groups and church 
groups during the campaign. Where does one 
draw the line between bribery and generosity?
Ipatasa liked to promote his image as the 
“action governor.” His speech in Wabag town on 
25 May, 2002, included the following: 
I don’t make empty promises to my 
beloved people of Enga. What I say is 
done on the same day or the following 
day. For instance, if the Kompiam-
Ambumu road maintenance does not 
start before the polling starts, you can call 
me a liar. All politicians are liars except 
me. Once, Mr Pundari also had a ground 
breaking ceremony and started a machine 
to maintain the Kompiam-Ambumu road 
but it had never took place as he 
said it would happen. That is why 
people have no faith in his leadership. 
People of Kompiam-Ambumu knew him 
as a Moresby man, whereas the whole 
province knows Ipatasa to be the only 
leader who is with the people who 
shares their joys and sorrows and burdens. 
People of Enga should know that Mr. 
Pundari is only interested in the task at 
the national level. He tricked the people 
of Enga by saying that he has his heart 
for Enga. The only leader in Enga you can 
trust is your action governor Peter Ipatas. 
I do things straight away. You can see my 
ﬁnger prints in every district. 
Why is Mr. Pundari so concerned about 
my wives? I didn’t try to take his wife 
away from him! Well, people of Enga, 
•  One man said that he found a 
candidate convincing because his 
speeches sound like a follow-up to the 
Catholic political awareness campaign.
•  An older woman said she thought that 
what a candidate had said was true and 
honest: “You can tell from his face.”
•  One of those unconvinced commented: 
“Speeches are cargo-cultic in scope and 
nature, especially crafted to win the 
hearts of the illiterate/uneducated.”
KEY PLAYERS FOR THE PROVINCIAL 
SEAT
Unlike some Highlands Provinces, the 
Provincial Seat was the focus of attention 
in Enga, particularly the competition and 
the war of words between John Pundari and 
Peter Ipatasa.5 Ipatasa was the sitting member 
and Governor. Pundari had been member for 
Kompiam-Ambumu but chose to stand for the 
Provincial seat, claiming that he wanted to stop 
corruption in the governance of the Province. 
The Provincial seat is important because the 
incumbent normally becomes Governor, which 
puts him in a position of considerable power 
over Provincial and Local Level Government 
resources. Pundari accused Ipatasa of not 
supporting him in the formation of the new 
national government in 1999, and Ipatasa 
accused Pundari of being part of a plot to 
suspend the Provincial Government in February 
2001. In 2001 while Pundari was a minister in 
the government, he invited the Prime Minister 
to visit his home area at Yumbalama. Ipatasa was 
there, and when Pundari came to present gifts to 
the visitors he began by giving a large healthy 
pig to the Prime Minister and a smaller blind 
pig to Ipatasa. The symbolism did not escape the 
notice of the large crowd. 
Later, on 17 May, 2002 in Wabag town 
Pundari gave a speech which included the 
following: 
At the last minute before the polling, you 
will be given some money in the night. 
This money in the form of K2.00 you 
can spend on tinned ﬁsh. This money is 
yours. You just eat it and give your vote 
free to John Pundari. [He is warning 
them against bribery.] John Pundari, 
Enga Regional! When Pundari wins, the 
sun in Enga will be bright for the rest of 
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don’t go deep into my private affairs. You 
can talk more about the services if they 
are not delivered to you. Mr. Pundari, 
please don’t judge me. Who are you to 
judge me? I fear God only for my sins. I 
do not judge you for your wrong doings. 
All of us are sinners. Let us not judge one 
another, let God alone judge each one of 
us. I know, I am taking more wives but I 
am on the other hand doing God a favour 
by delivering the basic services straight 
to His people. God chose men in the Old 
Testament times according to their good 
leadership qualities. He did not count 
their wives. Most of them had more than 
one wife. I am pretty sure that God really 
chose me and blesses my governorship 
in the province and with His help the 
province is prospering.7
Ipatasa has five wives and is reputed to have 
a life-style not in the best Christian tradition. 
In this speech one can see the emphasis on 
his accomplishments for the province and his 
attempts to belittle Pundari’s Christian image. 
Ipatasa is well known for giving handouts for 
projects and is known as the governor who 
“writes cheques on the ground” (yuu kaina seke 
pingi). In other words, he doesn’t even have to 
carry a cheque book, but will simply tell a group 
of people to come and pick up their cheque in 
Wabag the following week. 
Another popular Provincial candidate and 
former governor, Jeffery Balakau, took a different 
approach. In Wabag on 14 June he argued that 
the Enga governor seat was his because it was 
bought by his brother Malipu’s blood.8 (His 
brother Malipu Balakau, the Regional Member , 
was assassinated on 30 June 1989.) He claimed 
that Malipu never lost the seat but was killed in 
office. He did not die from a sickness but was 
killed, so, symbolically, his blood spilled over 
the seat. Jeffery Balakau says that according 
to Enga tradition he should have the right to 
claim the seat because the law of blood allows 
that. A song composed by his supporters goes as 
follows: Keapanya bui loo wapali bui, taeyokome 
sambapae o wane mana lato lakapupa (The 
Kiap’s star [position] in Wabag, bought by blood, 
the children will be taught about it.)
During the election period, some candidates 
and their supporters also engaged in blatantly 
dishonest practices such as stacking the electoral 
roll, paying off police and electoral officials, 
removing bridges and intimidation backed up by 
firearms.9 Despite police escorts, cars bringing 
ballot boxes were hijacked and the papers taken. 
Knowing that they could suffer casualties if they 
started a fire fight, police chose not to resist. It 
is difficult to assess to what degree such tactics 
affected the outcome. Ballot boxes meant for 
some polling places such as Talemanda in the 
middle Ambumu Valley were intercepted and 
polling officials were forced to work the whole 
night signing ballot papers. When people 
came to vote the next day they found that the 
“polling” had already happened and they had 
little option but to accept the result. Word has 
gone around that the polling officials felt it was 
unfair that their captors did not even provide 
cigarettes or tea during the night!10
CLAN CONSENSUS VOTING?
The responses to the questionnaires revealed 
four principal reasons for choosing a candidate:
•  Clan, marriage or other personal ties
•  Desire for material beneﬁt or personal 
gain
•  Personal qualities
•  Religious reasons
None of the respondents mentioned party 
membership. Enga people show little interest 
in parties. Some commented “I don’t trust 
any party,” or “I have no interest in parties.” 
Many were critical of the People’s Democratic 
Movement (PDM), seeing it as the cause of 
economic hardship, but Ipatas of PDM was the 
only sitting member re-elected in Enga.
Clan consensus voting is perhaps an ideal 
but is not widely practised at present in the 
Lower Ambumu area. In areas closer to the 
provincial capital, if candidates can convince 
a whole clan to unite behind them they are 
indeed fortunate. Perhaps a haus line (extended 
family) or close relatives will unite in their 
support, but that might be all he can hope for. 
Rather than clan consensus, decision making 
appears to take place more at a family or 
even individual level, based on three principal 
questions: 
•  What is my advantage in voting for N? 
•  What will be the cost of not voting for 
N?
•  How can we as a clan vote for several 
candidates as an insurance for the future?
Behind these questions lie several issues. 
What happens if someone gets sick? Who will 
come to our aid in a tribal fight? Who will give 
a paying job to members of my family? Who will 
help me with transport if I need it? How can I 
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travel safely through enemy territory? In the best 
of cases the “bunch of individuals living within 
clan boundaries” will realise that strength lies 
in numbers and they will cooperate in finding a 
solution to questions such as these. In the worst 
case someone simply points a gun or a knife at 
the electoral officials and instructs them how to 
fill in the voting papers.
The members of the Mulyao clan living 
near Par in the Lower Ambumu were “free” 
because they didn’t have their own candidate. 
They have several strong leaders with their own 
interests and these leaders influenced the clan 
to divide their votes three ways. The Lakoneme 
subclan voted for Pundari in the Provincial poll 
because Henry Mendai, one of their leaders, is 
Pundari’s campaign manager, and because one 
of Pundari’s brothers is a Mulyao clan member. 
Henry is a contractor for road and building 
projects and hoped that if Pundari won he could 
secure the lucrative contracts that in recent 
times have been the preserve of other groups 
such as Ipatasa’s Panda Construction Company. 
The Lakoneme subclan also voted for Henry 
as their council candidate. Another Mulyao 
subclan voted for Jeffrey Balakau in the 
Provincial poll because their leader was a friend 
to Balakau’s older brother. Two other Mulyao 
clan leaders and their followers supported Peter 
Ipatasa in the Provincial poll. 
After the voting at Rakaposa, the Mulyao 
meeting place, there were many ballot papers 
left unmarked, so they were taken to a house 
where one of the leaders demanded 200 votes 
for Jeffrey Balakau, 200 for Peter Ipatasa, and 
the remaining papers could be marked for John 
Pundari. Knowing that the leader making the 
demands and his sons were men not to be 
messed with, the rest complied.
The Mulyao strategy shows how individual 
male leaders in a clan could get their way 
without the consensus of the clan. Strong-willed 
individuals could go contrary to these leaders, 
but they would need to depend on their own 
resources in future rather than the patronage of 
the leader and support of other clan members. 
Thus, individuals may have their own strong 
opinion, yet, most people feel the pressure to 
take the good of the clan, sub-clan, or haus lain 
(extended family) into account when making 
choices.
 The voting figures in Table 2 show voting 
patterns for the Provincial Seat in the 35 boxes 
counted (out of a possible 80) in the Kompiam-
Ambumu electorate.11 In most polling places the 
vote is shared by several candidates indicating 
that there was little clan “consensus” since 
many polling places are attended by just one 
clan. However, in eight polling places (nos. 
11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 24, 25, 34) one candidate 
received all or nearly all the votes. There could 
be several reasons:
•  Leaders could have convinced people 
to “turn the table” and voluntarily give 
all their votes as a bloc to one candidate. 
This might happen at the polling place 
which is the home of that candidate or 
of a candidate for the Open Seat who is 
supporting him.
•  Ballot boxes could have been hijacked 
and the papers ﬁlled in by a candidate or 
his supporters.
•  People could have voted under duress. 
All three scenarios occurred in the Enga 
elections.
FREEDOM TO VOTE
Democratic principles call for freedom of 
the individual to vote and some confidentiality. 
Many people had no freedom to vote because 
they did not receive ballot papers. Papers 
had to be flown to isolated areas by an 
overworked army helicopter. Governor Ipatasa 
wanted to hire another helicopter using 
Enga government money, but fearing political 
interference, Pundari opposed that option. Thus 
people in Keman, Kaimanda, Pulupais, and most 
of the Wapi District never received ballot papers 
and boxes. People from Laialama walked for 
several days to bring in the ballot boxes after the 
helicopter failed. At one point the boxes with 
papers had been delivered to isolated Yengesa, 
but the polling officers were still in Kompiam 
with no way of getting to Yengesa. The ballot 
boxes at Yengesa were never picked up. In 
other parts of the Kompiam district, such as 
Lenganasa, Yawalimanda Wenikosa, Kaipotesa 
Lyaimanda, Lengeme, and Aipanda, people did 
not receive ballot papers because the bridges on 
the road had been destroyed or the ballot papers 
had been hijacked. 
It has already been noted that only 35 out of 
80 ballot boxes were counted in the Kompiam-
Ambumu electorate. As can be seen in Table 
3, more than half the ballot papers assigned 
were not counted, because they were destroyed 
during fights in the polling, or the helicopter 
was unable to carry boxes or officials to their 
destination, or papers being taken by road were 
hijacked, transport could not be arranged to 
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Polling Candidate
Place  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q
1     354 1132     280     8  
2     303 441     190  27   26  
3     388 89   9  42  3  29 2  
4   13  793 453 1    378  5   1  2
5     68 4     12       
6  1 5  105 433     390  7   1 25 
7   123  65 320   63  605  13 1 1 4 7 
8   38  239 215   206  713  3 1  31 4 
9   48  819 85   38  68  20 9 1 6  
10   5  130 325   13  119  12 71 13 2 1 
11     28      1213     1  
12     441 1     8  73  290   
13           1058       
14     113 1910     1       
15     3      1022       
16   5 1 886 64     39       
17   20  142 40   6  678  1 1 4 27  
18     639 2            
19     446             
20   20  371 484   53  58  4  39 16 4 
21  79   611             
22  25 6  96 76     15     1  
23  100   605 590            
24    1 1965      1  2     
25     1034        14     
26   151  349 148     143     5  
27  2   268 59     136  3  2 3  
28   6  301 1497     270  101     
29  3 11  109 238     29 3      
30  45   74 80    30 5  11     
31  48 1  497 3     278  5   29  
32     247 66    9 471  3   7 2 
33     272 113     469     1  
34           1266       
35   5  208 614     10  3   178 1 
Table 2: Voting for the Provincial Seat in the Kompiam-Aumbumu electorate
The voting ﬁgures in Table 2 show voting
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pick up the completed papers, or when the 
helicopter arrived, the boxes were no longer in 
the assigned places, people having attempted to 
carry the boxes to Wabag.
Apart from the Wabag town area, there 
is little confidentiality in voting. Voters 
are normally required to call the name of 
the persons they are voting for. Candidate’s 
supporters are close by to listen, or to “watch 
people’s mouths”. With so much invested in 
food and money, candidates and their supporters 
want to make sure that people vote for those 
who have given handouts. They want to see a 
person mark a cross or call out a name. Some 
people stayed away from the voting because they 
had accepted handouts from several candidates 
and feared the wrath of a candidate and his 
supporters. 
WOMEN AND THE VOTE
Women are often in a difficult position 
because they marry into a clan from other areas. 
Often a woman will want to vote for her close 
relative, even though it might not be the choice 
of her husband’s family. A woman from Par said 
how her husband has three wives and he had 
received money from a candidate and shared 
it with one wife. So on polling day when her 
husband went to claim the voting papers for 
his entire family she wrested some papers from 
his grasp and voted for her choice. When her 
husband wanted to beat her she told him that 
she “has a mouth too”. She was referring both to 
her right to voice her opinion, and that she had 
a mouth to “eat” the election handout.12
Several women at one Lower Ambumu 
booth refused to vote at all because they had 
not received handouts from any candidate. One 
young woman said, “Pundari’s supporters did 
not share what they were eating, like betel nut 
and cigarettes. They thought I would just follow 
their intentions as if I were their slave. Ipatasa’s 
supporters thought that I was for Pundari so they 
never talked or came close to me. I was really 
angry with them so I just refused to vote for any 
of them.”13
Other women decided not to vote because 
they were afraid of the consequences. Most 
of the nurses at Yampu hospital did not vote 
because they were afraid of what the local 
young men might do if they voted for an 
unpopular candidate. One expressed her concern 
as follows:
The fear was especially on whom 
to vote for in the Council election. 
Councillor candidates were from the same 
communities and if you vote for one, the 
other would not like you and your family 
because he would think that you favour 
the other and not him. If there had 
been a place for secret voting, that would 
have been ﬁne but our right to mark a 
leader was not allowed by our fear in that 
situation.14 
Another woman from Par told of her failed 
attempt at avoiding having to vote:
I was really worried. My brother had spent 
a lot of money and pigs in supporting 
A. But I felt indebted to B. So as the 
elections approached I was really worried. 
If I gave my vote to that other candidate, 
how could I go to my brother for help in 
the future? So I decided not to vote at 
all. I gave the excuse that my child was 
sick and I had to stay back to care for 
him. The polling started in the morning, 
so later in the afternoon I decided to go 
to see what had happened. However, just 
as I arrived I heard them calling the name 
of my family. I pretended not to hear, 
but they came and got me and forced me 
to go and get the voting papers for my 
family. I was afraid, so I took the ten 
papers and gave them to the presiding 
ofﬁcer to ﬁll in for me. As I went home 
I felt afraid and angry. I know my vote 
is power, yet I felt powerless. During the 
campaign I was interested but now I don’t 
care anymore.15 
Number of ballot papers assigned   73,991
Number of ballot papers counted   34,937
Papers destroyed at polling      5,070
Papers unable to be sent out to destination  12,775
Papers hijacked     16,371
Papers not returned after polling      4,823
Table 3: Fate of Ballot Papers in the Kompiam-Ambumu Electorate
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MULTIPLE VOTING
One way to avoid alienating candidates is to 
vote more than once. The principal rationale 
for this is to establish alliances with other clans 
so as to receive their support in future elections, 
or to “cover the field” in case another candidate 
wins. 
This year the only limit to the number of 
votes was the supply of papers. Hence, as shown 
by the Mulyao clan (above), clan leaders and 
some supporters met after the regular polling to 
decide how to split the vote on the remaining 
papers. To give another example, the Laita and 
Kali clans voted at Wakumale. As happened 
in many places the voting was not complete by 
nightfall. The Laita clan had voted first and the 
Kali second, thus many of the Kali clan had not 
had a chance to vote. So the unmarked papers 
were shared between the two clans, in order for 
the leaders of the clans to decide which candidate 
to vote for with those remaining papers. 
In questionnaire B (see appendix) people 
were asked: “How many times did you vote?” 25 
people responded that they voted only once. 31 
said more than once, the number ranging from 
twice to 28 times (a mature man). The latter is 
not an isolated case. One young woman said she 
voted 26 times, giving 25 votes to one candidate 
and one to another. Another young man said 25 
times and another mature man voted 23 times. 
These are not all “multiple” voting, but perhaps 
voting in another person’s name. Of those who 
voted more than once, 13 said that they split 
their vote
Multiple voting will be significant when 
planning for the preferential voting system due 
to be followed in future elections. In some ways 
the chance to vote legally for more than one 
candidate may relieve some of the pressure that 
people feel under the first past the post system. 
However, the added complexity of the counting 
will surely result in more strain.
DEMOCRACY
To what extent can Enga politics be called 
democratic? How can we measure democracy? 
Do we risk using a yardstick from liberal 
democratic principles nurtured in Western 
Europe? Are the examples in this paper 
illustrative of a “Melanesian” or an “Enga Way?” 
Admittedly democracy cannot be limited to 
forms such as found in America or Australia. 
For example, Papua New Guinean forms of 
democracy will surely show greater emphasis on 
communal than individual values. On the other 
hand, could it be, as Ron May has put it, that 
“the problems that beset Papua New Guinea will 
diminish the state’s legitimacy and eventually 
pose a threat to democracy that cannot be 
explained away as the result of a chaotic-looking 
but basically sound ‘Melanesian Way’ of doing 
politics” (May 2003a: 164). 
The pre-election Political Awareness 
Campaign sponsored by the Catholic church in 
Enga stressed people’s individual rights:
Your vote is very powerful. Your vote 
represents yourself. Your vote is special. 
Your vote can make big differences. Your 
word is the name that you are going to 
whisper at the polling booth. Your vote is 
very precious. Your vote is the X that you 
are going to put on the ballot paper. Your 
vote is your life…. 16
The gulf between the individual rights 
promoted by the church and some other 
NGOs, and the political realities of “gunpoint 
democracy” (Standish 1996) requires urgent 
debate before the next elections, since the 
campaign for the 2007 elections has already 
commenced.
The Swedish International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 
proposes two principles by which a governing 
arrangement can be called “democratic”: popular 
control over public decision making and 
decision makers; and equality between citizens 
in the exercise of that control. IDEA refers 
also to mediating values through which these 
two principles are realized in practice, including 
participation and accountability. For example, it 
is through participation in the electoral process 
that people authorize politicians to act on their 
behalf. They choose a representative assembly 
which they can hold accountable through the 
sanction of future electoral dismissal. 
If one applies these ideals to Enga during the 
2002 elections, one can only conclude that the 
democratic process was severely flawed.
•  Many people, particularly women, did 
not participate because they could not 
vote or felt afraid to vote, or judged it 
safer not to vote than to be seen voting 
for a losing candidate.
•  Voting papers were destroyed or not 
counted. In the Kompiam-Ambumu 
electorate, less than 44% of the ballot 
boxes were counted.
•  With such a strong presence of guns, 
often people did not have the freedom 
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to authorize their representatives to do 
anything.
•  Most candidates won by a small 
percentage of the vote – in three cases 
with less than 25% and in one case less 
than 10%. 
•  Lengthy court challenges with 
accusations of improper conduct raise 
questions about the legitimacy of the 
elected members.
•  There is little popular control or 
accountability when remaining in ofﬁce is 
seen in terms of “delivering the goods” or 
supplying “jobs for the boys.”
•  Equality ﬁnds little place in the post-
election situation of “haves” and “have-
nots.” (Lakane and Gibbs 2003). Thus 
supporters of politicians in power form 
a privileged elite, while the others, the 
“non-eaters” or have-nots, struggle to 
survive.
While this paper focuses on the 2002 
elections in Enga, elections alone are no 
guarantee of true democracy. Victory in the 
counting room does not mean an open 
cheque-book for the next five years. Political 
participation and democratic accountability are 
equally important between elections. Ideally the 
demos (common people) can participate in the 
honest governance of their country. In Enga, on 
the contrary, most experience what Joel Migdal 
(1988: 236) has called a “politics of survival” 
in the face of the fragmentation of traditional 
means of social and political control.
NEW POLITICAL STRUCTURES
Traditionally, Enga people did not elect 
leaders. Bigmen emerged as men of influence 
in settling disputes and controlling systems of 
pig exchange. They were men of wisdom, with 
strong personalities. There is some continuity 
today with would-be leaders who give away cars 
instead of pigs, but the monetary system has 
brought radical changes. People see voting as a 
way of getting access to money or the things 
that money can buy. 
The 2002 election was the eleventh in 
Enga (counting by-elections and provincial 
elections) since the first in 1964. Many people 
have commented how the 2002 election was 
different. Previously candidates were freer to 
travel widely to address people. In 2002 there 
were both political and economic restraints so 
that election campaigns were more subdued and 
largely limited to rallies organised by supporters 
who invited candidates to attend. The 2002 
election was also marked by more intimidation. 
Firearms are now a significant factor. We are 
witnessing new kinds of tribalism with a new 
type of leader who has access to guns and the 
ability to open or obstruct access to money and 
resources.
The system that is emerging has distinct 
disadvantages. Attempts to establish block 
voting within a clan may provoke anger in the 
community. Winners often favour supportive 
clans by funding their projects and providing 
services. Relationships soured do not mend 
easily. Election related tribal fights have claimed 
the lives of many people since the elections. 
Some public servants cannot distinguish 
between public servants and political cronies. 
During the election the Governor warned public 
servants against meddling in politics – that is, 
supporting other candidates. Government pay 
clerks withheld the incentive allowances of 
teachers who were known to support Pundari. 
Now, other public servants fear for their jobs. 
In an article in the Independent (25 July, 2002, 
p. 8) entitled, “Tsak people paying the price for 
using their democratic right,” a woman from the 
Tsak Valley describes the hardship of people who 
voted for the “wrong” candidate.17
Over the past fifteen years Enga has 
experienced rapid economic expansion and 
radical cultural change due largely to the 
massive Porgera Gold Mine. Until recently the 
Provincial Government received over 20 million 
kina (US$6 million) a year in royalty payments 
alone. This amount will halve before the next 
elections and cease when the mine closes around 
2012. The boom is over and in a few years 
Enga will be financially “poor.” Can a political 
culture in which a politician is elected primarily 
to channel goods and services continue when 
the economy shrinks so dramatically? Anarchy is 
possible if the political system cannot adapt.. 
CONCLUSION
Democracy is at risk in Enga. Freedom of 
choice between candidates, freedom to vote and 
a degree of confidentiality are not available to 
most voters. Critics could well debate whether 
the intimidation and rough-house politics of the 
emerging political culture reflects some form of 
‘non-liberal democracy’ (Gelu 2000). 
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Enga politics shares many features found 
throughout the Highlands: nepotistic patronage, 
parochialism and largesse bordering on 
“kleptocracy” (Ketan 2000:53)18. Elections are 
a form of investment, with successful candidates 
rewarding their supporters and disregarding 
others. However, there are also distinctive 
features in Enga. These include following strong-
willed leaders rather than clan “consensus” 
voting, the complete absence of confidentiality, 
and the ways strategic alliances are formed. The 
first two points have been illustrated in this paper. 
Ways of forming strategic alliances are so complex 
as to warrant separate study. Money, guns, and 
employment contribute to both continuities and 
innovations on the traditional Enga systems of 
forming alliances particularly for warfare and for 
the tee pig exchange.
The State appears powerless to control an 
increasingly volatile situation. For circumstances 
to improve some hard issues will have to be 
faced. There is an urgent need for a relatively 
accurate electoral roll. Also, there must 
be checks to counter political patronage 
and cronyism at all levels of the provincial 
administration. Democracy depends on an 
interplay between electoral participation and 
groups at the community level (civil society). 
Perhaps new forms of political structure will 
incorporate elements of traditional community 
networks. From another perspective the focus 
on provincial politics at the expense of national 
interests might well be modified. As people 
become more educated and have improved 
communication, there will be a greater demand 
for democratic processes that cater for wider 
issues and individual freedom of choice. 
Enga people have proved remarkably 
creative and resilient and no doubt will develop 
new dimensions of political culture. There is no 
shortage of criticism of the present situation. 
People are not afraid to tell a former member 
of parliament, Enganya pawa condom jina 
nepene (“You turned Enga people’s power into 
a condom”) and youth do not hesitate to sing, 
Kiaponya bui lao, Wapali bui, nengipi nanengipi 
game mende pilyo lakapuapa (“Kiap’s star, Wapali 
star [position in government], this is a game 
played between those who eat and those who 
don’t eat”). It remains to be seen how the game 
develops. 
APPENDIX – THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
The questions below are in English, but 
the Enga language was used by the educated 
research assistants who conducted the survey. 
Questionnaire A (for Politics in Enga during 
the campaign) No………
Name:  
Gender:  a)  male b)  female
Age:  a) youth  b) mature  c) old.  
Place/Clan
Education:  a)  0  b) Gr. 6  c) Gr. 10 
Religious Afﬁliation:
Status:   a) single  b) married 
Electorate: 
1. Have you listened to some political speeches? Y /  
N
1. (If Y, then continue)
2. Did you ﬁnd them interesting?  Y / N
3. If Yes, what did you ﬁnd interesting? If no, why was 
it not interesting?
4. Did you ﬁnd them convincing/persuasive? Y  /  N
5. If Y, what was convincing/persuasive?  If N, why?
6. 4. Did you hear any tok bokis (kongali) that were 
interesting?  Y / N. 
7. If Y, what was the kongali and what do you think 
it meant?
8. 5. Have you decided who you will vote for? Y  /  N  
9. Who? Why? 
10. 6. Does the party membership of the candidate 
inﬂuence you?  Y  /  N.
11. If yes, how does it inﬂuence you?
The profile for the respondents to questionnaire 
A is as follows: N = 34 (18 males and 16 
females). In age, 5 were “youth”, 18 “mature” 
and 11 “old”. 14 had no formal education, 8 
had a primary education, 12 had high school 
education including several with further 
education such as teachers’ training college. 
Those married numbered 25, with 9 single. 
Religious affiliation was: Catholic 24, SDA 4, 
Lutheran 3, Apostolic 1, AOG 1. 
Questionnaire B (for Politics in Enga after the 
election) No …..
Name:  Gender:  a)  male b)  female
Age:  a) youth  b) mature  c) old.  
Place/Clan
Education:  a)  0  b) Gr. 6  c) Gr. 10 
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Religious Afﬁliation:
Status:   a) single  b) married 
Electorate: 
1. Who did you vote for? 
2. What attracted you to that person so that you voted 
for him/her?
3. Did you change your mind many times about who 
to vote for, or was it always clear for you? (explain?) 
4. Did you hear any speeches given by the person you 
voted for?  Y / N If Y, do you think the speech was 
important in convincing you to vote for him/her, 
or was the speech not really important for you? 
a)  Important b) Not important c) Don’t know  
(Explain)
5. What were the positive qualities that you saw in the 
person that you voted for? 
6. Were there religious reasons behind your voting for 
that person?  Y /  N  If Y, explain.
7. How many times did you vote?  1  2 3 4 more …… 
) If more than once, was it for the same candidate or 
different ones? a) same  b) different
The profile for respondents to questionnaire B is 
as follows: N = 56 (26 male and 30 female). In 
age, 10 were “youth”, 34 “mature”, and 11 “old”. 
17 had no formal education, 31 had primary 
education and 8 had high school education. 
Those married numbered 43, with 13 not 
married. Religious affiliation was: Catholic 40, 
Lutheran 4, CAF 3, One Way 3, SDA 1, and 4 
not stated.
ENDNOTES
1 Grateful thanks are due to the many Enga people 
who helped in this study. To preserve conﬁdentiality 
they remain anonymous. 
2 Personal Communication, Provincial Returning 
Ofﬁcer, Electoral Commission Ofﬁce, Wabag, 
26.11.02
3 One polling ofﬁcial, while trying to be honest and 
return unused ballot papers, was held by the police 
and accused of being a paper smuggler! (Personal 
Communication, Peter Yange, at Lakemanda, 
23.11.02)
4 The rivalry between Ipatas and Talyaga was the focus 
of Tanim, a 50 minute documentary by Faraway 
Pictures, screened on SBS television in Australia on 
14 October 2003.
5 Bill Standish (2002b:6) says that in Simbu Province 
Regional candidates were able to campaign 
relatively freely around their much larger electorate 
“because Regional seats – which will disappear in 
2007 – are now seen as relatively insigniﬁcant, a 
rabis vot.” Engas do not share the same sentiments 
about their Provincial (Regional) seat. 
6 Speech given in the Enga language and translated 
from transcribed tape recording. 
7 Speech given in the Enga language and translated 
from transcribed tape recording.
8 Speech given in the Enga language and translated 
from transcribed tape recording.
9 See Post-Courier, ‘20 Engans Wounded in Ambush’, 
10 July 2002, p.3: “A man who was in the convoy 
of trucks and buses, transporting supporters and 
scrutineers of lawyer and Wapenamanda Open 
candidate Rimbink Pato, said they were on the 
way to Wabag when supporters of a rival candidate 
(named) ambushed them at Yaramanda.” This 
incident provoked a comment in the opinion 
column of the National: “It is ridiculous to pretend 
that national elections held now in either province 
will give voters there the Constitution-guaranteed 
freedoms associated with a democratic election. 
Murder, assault, major damage to public and private 
property, and above all the savage intimidation 
of substantial sections of the community in both 
provinces ensures that the vote will be a travesty. … 
As matters stand, Enga and the Southern Highlands 
provinces cannot be effectively controlled by 
leaders drawn from those areas. The provinces have 
become a meaningless delineation. The reality is 
tribes, and tribal alliances, and those who control 
them.” National, ‘Free Enga, SHP from the rule of 
the gun’, 10 July 2002, p.10. 
10 Nevertheless, the presiding ofﬁcers and community 
leaders later declared that the polling for those 
boxes was fair and the boxes were accepted for 
counting.
11 There are only 76 council wards in the Kompiam-
Ambumu Electorate. However, 80 boxes were 
assigned because two at Wakumale near Wabag 
Secondary School ofﬁcially form part of the 
Wabag Electorate, but geographically are on the 
“Ambumu” side of the Lai River, and two other 
polling places were given two boxes each because 
of tension between neigbouring clans voting there. 
The prime example is Aiyulites near Kompiam 
where bad feeling is still harboured after the murder 
of children in tribal hostilities in 2000. 
12 Personal communication. Lakemanda. 3.8.02
13 Personal communication. Yampu. 4.8.02
14 Personal communication. Yampu. 4.8.02
15 Personal communication. Par 3.8.02
16 From photocopied political awareness campaign 
notes supplied by Philip Maso. 
17 The article begins: “The sick have become the 
subject of intimidation because health workers 
prefer to attend to those who vote their candidates. 
Women are raped as they try to use bush tracks to 
get to stores to buy food. Bridges were dismantled 
leaving only the skeleton iron frame, too risky for 
vehicles to use. …” 
18 Ketan describes “kleptocracy” as the theft of state 
funds and other resources by government ofﬁcials 
and the high tolerance of corruption in government 
(Ketan 2000:86).
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eight open electorates in the SHP. It extends 
northwest from Koroba and Mogorofugwa — 
two densely populated wetland basins inhabited 
by Huli speakers — towards the Strickland-
Lagaip river junction, thereby taking in country 
inhabited by the Duna, Bogaia and Hewa. At 
the time of the 2002 National Election the 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago open electorate was home 
to some 43,500 Huli, Duna, Hewa and Bogaia 
speakers.19 Of these 24,850 (57%) identify 
primarily as Huli; 16,055 (37%) as Duna; 2,310 
(5.3%) as Hewa and 285 (0.7%) as Bogaia. It is 
this ethnic mix that has, in the past, made for 
fiercely contested parliamentary elections. In 
1997, for instance, the electoral contest centred 
very much on ethnicity, and who, from a Duna 
perspective at least, might provide for or best 
facilitate the advancement and unity of Duna 
people. 
Except for the period 1977-1982, the 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago seat has always been 
held by the Huli. For the past two decades the 
Duna, Hewa and Bogaia have been represented 
exclusively by Huli men in the National 
Parliament. The Huli’s past electoral successes 
reflect their majority status. Huli outnumber 
Duna 3:2 in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago open 
electorate and 4:1 in the Tari-Pori open 
electorate. Yet, despite the obvious electoral 
advantage the Huli command, Duna candidates 
have contested the Koroba-Lake Kopiago open 
electorate with fervour since it was established 
in 1972. The Bogaia and Hewa, however, have 
never fielded a candidate. 
Comparatively speaking, the ethnically Huli 
parts of Koroba-Lake Kopiago are far better 
developed than those of the Lake Kopiago sub-
district, home to the Duna, Bogaia and Hewa 
voters. This disparity is a source of discontent. 
The Lake Kopiago sub-district is one of the 
least developed in the country and lacks 
even the most basic services. That it remains 
disadvantaged and poorly developed relative 
to other districts within PNG has been shown 
by three separate studies over a 30-year period 
(Wilson 1974; de Albuquerque and D’Sa 1986; 
Hanson, Allen, Bourke and McCarthy 2001). 
In part this disadvantage is explained by the 
fact that the Lake Kopiago sub-district was one 
of the last to be derestricted,20 but the Duna lay 
the blame squarely upon their Huli neighbours.
In the contemporary context, the Duna, 
Hewa and Bogaia within the electorate share 
the belief that the Huli are directly responsible 
for their disadvantage and the disintegration 
of essential services such as schools, law 
enforcement, agricultural extension and health. 
A FAILED ELECTION: 
THE CASE OF THE 
KOROBA-LAKE 
KOPIAGO OPEN 
ELECTORATE
NICOLE HALEY
In July 2002, following clarification from 
the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea, the 
2002 National Elections were deemed to have 
failed in six Southern Highlands Province 
(SHP) electorates, leaving the greater part of 
the province’s population without political 
representation and six of the seats in PNG’s 
109 seat parliament vacant. Some nine months 
later, supplementary elections were held to fill 
the seats in Kagua-Erave, Imbonggu, Komo-
Magarima, Koroba-Lake Kopiago, Tari-Pori and 
the Provincial seat. Focussing on the Koroba-
Lake Kopiago open seat, this paper provides 
an account of campaigning and electioneering 
during both the failed 2002 National Elections 
and the 2003 Supplementary Elections.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the 
manner in which the 2002 elections were 
conducted in the Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
electorate was not significantly different to 
the way the elections were conducted in 1997. 
Cultural identity and ethnicity played an 
important part in campaigning, motivating 
much of the malpractice and election fraud 
which featured in both the 1997 and 2002 
elections (see Haley 2002a). In both instances 
the elections were not the least bit fair and 
lacked integrity, so much so that the candidates 
and their supporters sought to secure votes 
by fraudulent means. Yet, election practices 
tolerated in 1997 saw the 2002 election deemed 
a failure. In this paper I wish to examine and 
compare the way the elections were conducted 
in the failed 2002 National Elections and the 
“successful” 2003 Supplementary Elections, and 
consider the implications for future elections.
ETHNICITY: A KEY ELECTORAL ISSUE
In 1997, 2002 and 2003, ethnicity was 
a key electoral issue. The Koroba-Kopiago 
open electorate is the north westernmost of 
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When they complain about a lack of support 
from successive national governments, their 
complaints are invariably directed towards the 
Huli. These feelings have been brewing for 
decades. Duna, for example, see themselves 
as having been colonised and governed by 
the Huli, and accuse the Huli with both 
monopolising and controlling their access to the 
State and, in particular, their access to health 
and educational services. 
Resource development and access to the 
benefits that oil and gas production and mining 
have brought to the province are another key 
source of discontent within the electorate. 
Duna, for instance, hold the view that Huli 
have disproportionately benefited from resource 
development projects and they are quick to 
condemn Huli actions with respect to mining. 
Their discontent is rationalised in terms of 
traditional cosmological beliefs. Duna see 
themselves as part of regional system deeply 
rooted in mythology and ritual. They believe 
that the fertility of their region is morally 
constituted (Haley 2002b) and point out that 
in the past Duna, Huli, Hewa and Bogaia 
collaboratively participated in ground-seeding 
and ground-making rituals in order to ensure 
the ongoing fertility of the region. These rituals, 
which involve the sacrifice of human substances 
and body parts, were enacted along ritual roads 
which criss-crossed the region. Today, Duna 
charge the Huli with having forsaken both 
the regional ritual projects they once strongly 
promoted (see Ballard 1994; 2000:213) and the 
ties which made such cooperative performances 
possible. 
Duna now see the Huli as pillaging, rather 
than preserving, the fertile substance of the 
earth’s core. They regard the gold, oil and 
gas extracted at Porgera, Mt Kare, Hides, 
Moran, Kutubu and Gobe as part of this fertile 
substance, and insist that the Huli are wantonly 
consuming that which should be conserved in 
order to sustain them and the world. Duna feel 
that Huli have sold them out. They charge the 
Huli with monopolising the fruits born of their 
co-operative ritual efforts. 
Before we [Huli and Duna] stayed 
together like a married couple. Our union 
bore fruit. Our union bore the oil and 
gas…. Those things are as much ours. But 
they [the Huli] are using it, expending it. 
They have forgotten us. 
Sane Noma - Haley ( NB3:54)
Original recorded in Duna
The Duna likewise charge the Huli with 
having selectively forgotten that they are 
brothers who trace descent from a common 
ancestor, Hela. They note that the Huli 
readily invoke the rhetoric of their common 
ancestry when calling for a Hela province, but 
that they have failed to look after their Duna 
brothers, going as far as chasing them away 
from Mt Kare during the height of the gold 
rush (Haley 2002b). For the most part, Duna 
have not embraced the growing calls for a Hela 
province (Biersack 1995; Vail 1995; Goldman 
ms). They want no part in such a project and 
have denounced it. They see it as a Huli-owned 
and driven project, which will bring them 
no benefits. Many Duna consider the project 
sinister, suggesting that if it succeeds they will 
lose not only their land, but also their identity. 
In the face of such concerns the past 
decade has seen growing calls for Duna unity. 
Indeed, campaigning in the Lake Kopiago sub-
district (that part of the Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
electorate which is ethnically Duna) in the lead 
up to the 1997 and 2002 National Elections 
focussed on the need for Duna unity in the 
political arena, and the need to secure national 
representation as a matter of urgency. Both 
elections were promoted locally as the “final 
election”— the last chance to gain political 
representation (Robinson 2002). Accompanying 
the calls for unity were calls for the formation of 
a Duna Province. 
THE 2002 CANDIDATES
There were 19 candidates in the 2002 
election for Koroba-Lake Kopiago. This 
compared with 13 candidates in the 1997 
election and 12 candidates in 1992 election. 
Of the 19 candidates, 13 were Huli and 6 
were Duna. All were male. None of the Huli 
candidates, apart from the sitting member, 
Herowa Agiwa, had contested the 1997 
election. Of the Duna candidates, Jack Karali, 
Petrus Thomas, and Jack Hundia were also first 
time contenders, but Paiele Elo had contested 
the seat on six previous occasions, Ben Peri on 
three previous occasions, and Matthew Magaye 
twice before. In 1997, Matthew Magaye (6,582 
votes) had polled a very close second to Herowa 
Agiwa (6,693 votes), while Ben Peri (5,109 
votes) had run third. 
In 2002, 13 of the 19 candidates had party 
endorsement and 13 separate parties were 
represented. In 1997, 10 of the 13 candidates 
had party endorsement whereas in the 1992 
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election only two of the 12 candidates had party 
endorsement. As in 1997 there was no evidence 
that party affiliation signalled an endorsement 
of particular political views or positions. All the 
candidates campaigned on similar platforms: 
they promised to bring development; to 
support church, women’s and youth groups; 
to strengthen government services; to ensure 
that roads and airstrips were maintained and 
to ensure that schools and health centres were 
properly funded. 
The benefits of incumbency, particularly the 
considerable amounts of money that Herowa 
Agiwa had been able to spend “buying” votes 
in the Huli speaking parts of the electorate 
during his 10 years in office, meant that the 13 
first-time Huli candidates had little chance of 
defeating the sitting member. 
Several of the Duna candidates, though, 
emerged as strong contenders. In the lead up 
to voting, it was evident that Matthew Magaye 
and Ben Peri continued to have strong support, 
especially in their home areas of Auwi/Logaiyu 
and Kopiago respectively. Matthew Magaye 
maintained and even expanded his strong 
support base. His popularity derived primarily 
from his ability to make things happen. For 
instance, he is widely credited with having 
established Paga High School which has enabled 
young Duna men and women to continue their 
education without fear of attacks and ethnic 
violence (see also Haley 2002a). For this reason 
the school is thought to have benefited the 
entire community, not just Matthew’s home 
area.
Despite the obvious support for Matthew 
Magaye and his strong polling in the last two 
elections, Ben Peri for the most part retained 
his popularity in the Kopiago area, having both 
widespread grass root support and the backing 
of the older community leaders. As in 1997, 
Ben was touted as the candidate most likely 
to effect real change for the Duna, Hewa and 
Bogaia of the Lake-Kopiago sub-district (Haley 
2002a; Robinson 2002). He was also reputed to 
have the support of disgruntled Huli. That said, 
there were sections of the Kopiago community 
who were agitating for change. Some of Ben’s 
strongest supporters in 1992 and 1997 felt that 
he had passed his use-by-date and had failed 
to deliver. They thought that Ben would once 
again be defeated, even though he retained 
strong support. As the campaigning progressed, 
support for Ben grew, despite concerns about 
the need for new blood and a new approach. 
Significantly, his support was strengthened when 
he was taken hostage during the campaign (see 
below), and because he had the support and 
endorsement of the disgraced SHP Governor, 
Anderson Agiru, who remained extremely 
popular despite having been removed from 
public office.
Although Ben Peri and Matthew Magaye 
were considered the strongest Duna candidates, 
newcomers Petrus Thomas and Jack Karali 
also attracted much talk and attention. Petrus 
Thomas, a local rugby star who had played for 
both the Mendi Muruks and the Kumuls, had 
the support of young men/boys throughout the 
Duna speaking area. He was thought to have an 
outside chance of winning the electoral race.
CAMPAIGNING IN 2002
Cultural identity and ethnicity played an 
important part in campaigning in the Lake 
Kopiago sub-district during both the 1997 and 
2002 National Elections. Dance festivals, in 
which much energy was spent on articulating 
Duna identity, were held on a regular basis. 
These competitions, sponsored by the Duna 
candidates, were viewed as a healthy way 
of promoting both Duna identity and Duna 
unity. What was particularly interesting about 
these dance competitions was that they were 
attended by supporters of the various Duna 
candidates. Within the Duna speaking area, 
Duna candidates and their supporters were 
free to move around and campaign. Elsewhere 
in the country (particularly the Highlands), 
however, candidates and their supporters were 
not afforded such mobility. In contrast, this 
freedom of movement did not extend to the 
Huli candidates.
Men and women, young and old, earnestly 
participated in these dance competitions in 
which all the participants were encouraged 
to dress in “true” Duna fashion. Old men and 
women, concerned that their children were 
coming to look and behave like Huli, chastised 
younger men for wearing their headband 
too high on their forehead, or for decorating 
themselves with red and yellow face paints 
instead of blackening their faces with ash - both 
are considered Huli fashions. The dress and 
deportment of the dancers and dance festivals 
throughout the campaign was seen to reflect 
the likelihood of a Duna candidate winning at 
the polls. For the project to succeed it was felt 
that all Duna candidates had to work together; 
the efficacy of the project depended upon 
people coming together for a common purpose. 
At another level, the extent to which Duna 
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decorated themselves faithfully was interpreted 
as a reflection of their social and moral standing 
and the state of their world more generally.21 
Although the Duna candidates could move 
throughout the Duna speaking parts of the 
electorate, they warned off and chased away 
any Huli candidates who dared to attempt to 
campaign in their areas. For the most part, fear 
of violent attacks also kept the Duna candidates 
from campaigning in the ethnically Huli parts of 
the electorate.
Ben Peri was the only Duna candidate 
to actively campaign in the Huli-speaking 
Koroba District. As mentioned earlier, he 
had successfully garnered the support of 
disgruntled Huli in the 1997 elections. A partial 
explanation may have been that Ben’s second 
wife is Huli and that he was well known, having 
worked out of the Tari area for many years. 
But Ben has also avidly supported the calls 
for a Hela Province and this no doubt would 
have endeared him to the Huli voters. In 2002, 
Ben was widely thought to be Herowa Agiwa’s 
biggest rival. 
Whilst being accompanied by a police 
escort on Friday 17 May 2002, Ben Peri’s 
campaign party was held up in the Koroba area. 
A gunfight ensued. One policeman was killed 
and two others injured. Ben Peri and another 
two policemen were taken hostage. They were 
eventually released six days later following 
intense negotiations by the dismissed yet still 
extremely popular, Governor Anderson Agiru. 
During the course of the hostage crisis,Ben 
Peri’s captors publicly demanded a ransom of 
K500,000 (about AUD $200,000) for his release. 
What was remarkable about these events, 
was that the sitting member, Herowa Agiwa, 
refused to become involved in brokering a 
solution. He was reported to have been in 
Australia when the kidnapping took place, 
but upon his return to PNG he stayed in Port 
Moresby for the remainder of the crisis. In the 
Post Courier on 22 May 2002, he was reported 
to have admitted that the men holding the 
hostages were his supporters and to have 
publicly stated that he would not intervene.
In the electorate, it was rumoured that 
Herowa Agiwa had orchestrated these events. 
From several sources, I was told that the sitting 
member had placed a K300,000 contract on Ben 
Peri and that this was why his vehicle had been 
held up. Ben’s Kopiago supporters claim that 
when Herowa Agiwa heard that a policeman 
had been shot and killed, he became reluctant 
to pay. Accordingly, the captors sought to 
obtain the ransom. Locally, the then Koroba 
District Administrator, Stanley Kotange, who 
was reputed to have kept regular radio/satellite 
phone contact with the sitting member, was also 
implicated in these events.22
Whilst it remains unclear whether Herowa 
Agiwa and Stanley Kotange actually had any 
involvement in Ben Peri’s kidnapping, it is 
certainly the case that Stanley Kotange played 
an instrumental role in another of the crises 
to grip the electorate during the campaign 
period. In late May 2002, in his capacity as 
District Administrator, Kotange sent letters to 
Hevilift, Missionary Aviation Fellowship (MAF) 
and Southwest Air, advising that any aircraft, 
commercial or otherwise, flying in the Koroba-
Lake Kopiago electorate during the polling 
period would be shot down.23 I was shown a 
copy of the letter in the company of Nueman 
Pakalu, the Assistant District Administrator 
(ADA) from Lake Kopiago, who angrily said he 
had heard of no such threats, putting it down 
to an election stunt. On reading the letter he 
informed me that Kotange was appointed to the 
position of District Administrator by Herowa 
Agiwa and that he was known to be one of the 
sitting members closest allies. Nueman though 
was hardly a neutral observer – a community 
school teacher by profession, he was publicly 
aligned with Ben Peri and had been appointed 
to the position of ADA at Lake Kopiago by 
Anderson Agiru.
Stanley Kotange’s letter claimed that there 
were high-powered weapons throughout the 
electorate and that some people even had 
surface-to-air missile launchers. I have since had 
this confirmed by several people from Kopiago. 
The letter also made reference to two incidents 
in which Hevilift helicopters were damaged 
during the 1997 elections. In one instance a 
helicopter carrying bribe money from Herowa 
Agiwa was stoned (see Robinson 2002) and 
in another incident a helicopter in which he 
was a passenger was shot at. The Hevilift pilot 
who showed me Kotange’s letter advised that 
the later incident had resulted in over USD 
$300,000 damage to the helicopter. As a result, 
all airstrips in Koroba-Lake Kopiago were closed 
in the period leading up to polling. An article 
which appeared in the PNG Post-Courier on 3 
June 2002 quoted one airline operation manager 
as saying that they had received specific threats 
from Pugua, Herowa Agiwa’s home area and the 
place where Ben Peri was held hostage.
In another quite separate incident, 16 
of the candidates contesting the Koroba-
Lake Kopiago seat threatened to boycott the 
elections alleging a conspiracy on the part of 
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Mr Kotange (see PNG Post Courier, 5 June 
2002, p. 8). In late May 2002, the appointments 
of several returning officers who had already 
attended their electoral briefings and training 
in Mt Hagen were inexplicably revoked. These 
men were public servants with past electoral 
experience. It was claimed that they had 
been replaced by men known to support the 
sitting member. Only Kotange retained his 
appointment as Principal Returning Officer. 
After complaints to the Electoral Commission 
and Ombudsman the other returning officers 
were reinstated at the eleventh hour. 
ELECTION FRAUD AND 
MALPRACTICE
Attempts to influence the election took 
place at many levels, both before and after 
voting got under way. Fraudulent electoral 
practices employed in 1997, were again 
employed across the entire electorate in 2002 
(Haley 2002a, Robinson 2002). The principle 
roll of electors was grossly inaccurate, with 
voter numbers being greatly exaggerated. The 
common roll in respect of the Lake Kopiago 
Rural LLG, for instance, contained close 
to three times as many enrolled voters as 
eligible voters. It was not updated by Electoral 
Commission staff but by Nueman Pakalu, the 
community school teacher appointed to the 
position of ADA by Anderson Agiru (see also 
May 2002:03). As noted above, Nueman both 
supported and was publicly aligned with Ben 
Peri. He was assisted in the task of updating 
the roll by local young men who had publicly 
supported Ben in past elections. 
Specifically voter numbers were inflated by 
including individual voters under each of the 
names they commonly go by and by duplicating 
council wards under separate names – for 
instance, Ambi, Waki and Ambi-Waiki are all 
listed complete with a total of 1431 names. In 
1997, the total population of the Ambi-Waiki 
area, as confirmed by a household census, was 
316 people and of these only 155 were eligible 
to vote (Robinson and Haley 1998a).
Such examples are not isolated. Indeed the 
extent to which voter numbers were inflated 
outstripped even the vastly exaggerated 1997 
figures. For instance, the principal roll of 
electors employed during the 1997 election 
contained the names of some 40,000 so-called 
eligible voters. Based on projected population 
figures, confirmed in many areas by the 
household census conducted in 1997 (Haley and 
Robinson 1998; Robinson and Haley 1998a, 
1998b), I have concluded that in 1997 there 
should have been no more than 22,000 eligible 
voters within the electorate (Haley 2002a). In 
2002, the common roll included the names of 
60,300 enrolled voters. Based on population 
estimates projected from the 1990 National 
Census and the census data Robinson and I 
collected in 1997, I estimate that there should 
have been no more 24,000 eligible voters within 
the electorate. Accordingly there were 2½ times 
as many enrolled voters as eligible voters within 
the electorate. 
Intimidatory force was also used to influence 
the vote. Ballot boxes were impounded, stolen 
or diverted to other areas and completed 
ballot papers were confiscated and destroyed. 
Candidates and their supporters throughout 
the region took control of ballot papers and 
boxes ensuring block votes for their preferred 
candidate. 
One presiding officer boasted to me how 
he and the Returning Officer had allocated 
a certain number of boxes to each of the 
candidates in the interest of “fairness”, keeping 
the majority for their favoured candidate – Ben 
Peri. Another told how he and his brother 
completed and endorsed the 1000 or so ballot 
papers given to them by the Assistant Returning 
Officer, the evening prior to polling. The same 
presiding officer reported that others had done 
the same. In some instances a small percentage 
of the ballot papers were completed such that 
votes were given to a variety of candidates, 
so as to give the appearance of fair play and 
allay suspicions the votes had been gained by 
misadventure. By all accounts, most of the ballot 
papers for the Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate 
were completed by the locally employed polling 
officials themselves, prior to the actual polling 
day. No one I interviewed in the Kopiago area 
actually got to vote on polling day and few 
if any sighted, let alone touched, their ballot 
papers.
In the case of Koroba-Lake Kopiago the 
attempts to steal the election through inflated 
voter numbers proved futile as only a small 
fraction of the ballot boxes were actually 
counted. Indeed, while over 100 ballot boxes 
were distributed throughout the electorate, only 
three were actually counted. In a press release 
dated 23 July 2002, Rueben Kaiulo announced 
that counting for the Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
electorate was underway in Mount Hagen, with 
ballot boxes being flown in by Defence Force 
and Police helicopters. Contrary to the press 
release, no counting for Koroba-Lake Kopiago 
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took place in Mount Hagen. In fact the three 
ballot boxes which were counted, were counted 
at Hedemari, a Huli speaking area between Tari 
and Koroba, and thence carried by foot through 
Paiela to Porgera, via Mt Kare, and from there 
by PMV to Mt Hagen. 
Contrary to Rueben Kaiulo’s assertion, 
no ballot boxes were collected by Defence 
Force or Police helicopters. In fact apart from 
the three boxes containing votes for Herowa 
Agiwa few of the other ballot boxes distributed 
throughout the electorate were ever collected. 
On 12 August 2002, the PNG Post-Courier 
reported John Aiyako, the then Deputy District 
Administrator for Koroba, as saying that there 
were still 17 ballot boxes in the custody of 
Neuman Pakalu (Assistant Returning Officer, 
Lake Kopiago), 10 ballot boxes in the custody 
of Jackson Kenamu (Assistant Returning 
Officer, Auwi/Logaiyu) and 28 ballot boxes 
with Johnson Balu (Assistant Returning Officer, 
South Koroba). No helicopters were ever sent to 
collect these ballot boxes or the polling officials 
– they made their own way back to Mendi. I 
was told by one presiding officer that he and 
“his boys” had guarded the 2002 ballot boxes 
for several months in the hope they might be 
collected and counted. As recently as October 
2003, many of these boxes were still sitting in 
the Lake Kopiago District Office. 
According to local election officials, the 
Kopiago and Auwi/Logaiyu boxes were not 
collected as they had been “tampered with”, 
having been flown into the more remote 
parts of the electorate by a private charter. 
Apparently no Electoral Commission funds 
were made available to distribute the ballot 
boxes and papers to those parts of the electorate 
which are accessible only by air – that is the 
ethnically Duna, Hewa and Bogaia parts of the 
electorate. Fearing that his supporters would 
not get the chance to vote, Ben Peri charted 
the plane which delivered the ballot boxes to 
Auwi and Kopiago, and it was for this reason 
that Stanley Kotange, the Principal Returning 
Officer, refused to collect or count the boxes in 
question.
Despite the fact that no attempt was made 
to recover the ballot boxes held in more remote 
parts of the electorate, Stanley Kotange declared 
Herowa Agiwa the winner of the Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago Open Electorate on 11 July 2002, 
announcing that Mr Agiwa had gained all 
2985 votes in the three and only ballot boxes 
counted. A fortnight later on 25 July, the Post 
Courier reported that the sitting member for 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago had been returned on 
the basis of counting which had taken place a 
fortnight earlier at Koroba. Subsequent to this it 
was deemed that the elections in Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago had failed.
The declaration that the SHP elections had 
failed resulted in widespread confusion and an 
escalation of violence throughout the province. 
Dozens of power pylons between Nogoli and 
Porgera were felled by disgruntled electors, 
meaning that production was forcibly suspended 
for three months. Thousands of employees were 
stood down and much revenue was lost. In 
the weeks following the election, the leading 
SHP candidates in the six undeclared seats 
declared themselves to be duly elected members 
of Parliament. These same men and their 
supporters threatened to disrupt the provinces 
resource projects and promised to “bring the 
nation to its knees” if their demands to be 
sworn in were not acceded to. The group of six 
also wrote to the Prime Minister, Sir Michael 
Somare, threatening to secede. A spokesman for 
the group’s supporters was reported in the Post 
Courier to have said:
I’m giving the Someare-led government 
until 4.06pm tomorrow to declare the 
remaining six seats…If we don’t have a 
reply (to the above mentioned letter) by 
4.06 (close of business) tomorrow, then 
the Southern Highlanders will become a 
republic country... More people will die. 
Roads will be blocked, more bridges will 
be blown up.” (John Honale quoted in 
the Post Courier, 9 August 2002.)
Despite this pressure, the six leading 
candidates were not sworn in. They and their 
supporters were forced to wait a further nine 
months for fresh elections. During this time 
much energy was spent restoring law and order 
within the province, in preparation for the 
supplementary elections.
THE 2003 SUPPLEMENTARY 
ELECTIONS
Although 19 candidates (13 Huli and 6 
Duna) contested the failed 2002 National 
Elections, only 12 candidates ran for the 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open seat during the 
2003 Supplementary Elections. Of these 10 were 
Huli and only two were Duna. All bar two of 
the Huli candidates contested the failed 2002 
elections. In the intervening months, four of the 
Duna candidates – Mathew Magaye, Paiele Elo, 
Jack Karali and Jack Hundia – stood down in 
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favour of Petrus Thomas. Instead of contesting 
the elections, they actively campaigned, both 
individually and collectively, on Petrus’s behalf 
and instructed their own supporters to transfer 
their support to Petrus. It was felt that if only 
one Duna candidate contested the election, he 
would surely win and for the first time in two 
decades the Duna would be represented in the 
National Parliament. The candidates who stood 
down in favour of Petrus are reputed to have 
held the view that Ben Peri had not only failed 
to deliver for Duna people, but that he had sold 
them out by openly supporting the push for a 
Hela province. They chose instead to favour 
“new blood” and the fresh approach Petrus 
offered.
Unlike Ben, who promised that every one 
would become fabulously wealthy by growing 
vanilla and coffee if he won the electoral 
race,24 Petrus did not campaign with money or 
grandiose promises. Instead he made a point 
of visiting the electorate, sitting with people, 
talking to them and listening to their needs. He 
gained people’s respect by sharing sweet potato 
and sugar cane rather than attempting to buy 
their votes. Petrus promised not to play politics 
but instead to unite the Duna people and to 
work towards improving their situation. 
Prior to polling, Petrus was considered to 
be the hot favourite. The view in the Duna 
camp was that if the election was the least 
bit fair, Petrus would win the seat, although 
it was held that both Duna candidates would 
poll well. Indeed, it was felt that with 10 Huli 
candidates contesting the seat, their votes would 
be very much split, leaving the way for a Duna 
candidate to claim the seat. That said, a couple 
of the Huli candidates were highly regarded 
and this too was held to strengthen the Duna 
candidates chances. For instance, the sitting 
member was still held to command a great deal 
of support and Fr Mattius Olape, a Catholic 
Priest from Pureni, was held to be “a good 
honest man” who had a great deal of support. 
Petrus Thomas’s supporters considered him the 
Huli candidate most likely to mount a serious 
challenge. 
In the months prior to the supplementary 
elections, there was much confusion about 
whether the new preferential system of vote 
counting would apply or whether the first past 
the post system would again be employed. Petrus 
Thomas courted several of the Huli candidates 
and made deals to trade preferences on the basis 
that the new system would be enforced. By the 
time polling was underway, several of the Huli 
candidates were covertly supporting Petrus 
Thomas. They ran, I am told, to split the Huli 
vote. Matthew Makape, a popular Community 
Relations Officer from BP Hides, and former 
Rugby playing mate of Petrus’, ran to cut Fr 
Mattius’ vote. Both men were from Pureni, and 
it was hoped Matthew would pick up the votes 
of the younger boys. Matthew secured 1164 
votes (mostly from Pureni and Tangi), as against 
the 3730 Fr Mattius gained. In the Koroba area, 
Joe Kaiyura Mindi, a community school teacher 
from Tangi, and Ben Maui Mindiria, a science 
graduate from Maria, ran to spit the sitting 
member’s vote. They secured 557 and 819 votes 
respectively – principally gained in the North 
and South Koroba areas, as against the 3292 
votes gained by the sitting member. 
From a Duna perspective, though, the 
electoral contest was a race between Ben Peri 
(a fourth time contender) and Petrus Thomas 
an electoral newcomer. Both were Kopiago 
boys; their mothers are both from Aiyuguni, 
while their fathers are from Hagini and 
Mbatane respectively. As well, they both have 
connections in the upper Tumbudu area. Ben’s 
father’s mother is from Hirane\Saiya, a Kopiago 
clan which originates from Pugua, whilst Petrus’ 
father’s mother is from the Tangi area. In terms 
of their respective connections, Ben and Petrus 
drew on much the same support base, however 
Petrus had the advantage of public support from 
the extremely popular Matthew Magaye, who 
ran second to Herowa Agiwa in 1992 and 1997. 
In both previous elections, Matthew picked 
up the majority of Auwi/Logaiyu votes and it 
was felt that because he had endorsed Petrus’ 
campaign most of the Auwi/Logaiyu votes 
would go directly to Petrus instead of being split 
between the two Duna candidates.
POLLING
Unlike the 2002 failed elections, the 2003 
supplementary elections proceeded without 
major incident. In a departure from past 
practices, large numbers of police were deployed 
throughout the electorate to maintain order. 
In the Kopiago area, for instance, four police 
officers were stationed at each polling place. 
This meant that those listed on the common 
roll actually got to vote, and by all accounts 
they were able to vote for the candidate of their 
choice. Several women I have interviewed since 
insisted that it was the “best election ever” for 
this very reason. 
By all accounts, incidents of multiple 
voting were substantially reduced as well, 
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although this is not reflected in the total 
number of votes counted. Indeed, unlike 1997 
where the majority of young men interviewed 
claimed to have voted two and three times 
each at neighbouring polling places, very few 
young men claim to have successfully done so 
during the supplementary elections. However, 
it should be noted that the total number of 
ballots allowed (42,462), more accurately 
reflects the total population of the electorate 
(approximately 43,500) as opposed to its voting 
population, suggesting that two votes were cast 
for each eligible voter. Interestingly, most people 
at Kopiago expressed genuine disbelief when I 
informed them that twice as many votes were 
cast than should have been.
Whereas multiple voting in its various 
guises accounted for the extra votes cast in 
1997, underage voting accounts for much of 
the inflated 2003 count. Whilst polling officials 
and police made concerted efforts to ensure that 
individuals voted only once, they did not try 
and restrict the incidence of underage voting. 
I interviewed children as young as eight who 
reported not only voting, but voting for the 
candidate of their choice. These same children 
reported that they filled out the ballot papers 
without assistance from their parents or polling 
officials. In 1997, many children at Kopiago had 
votes cast in their names, but few actually got 
to vote themselves. In 2003, it seems any child 
who was school age or above was afforded the 
right to vote. Remarkably, several women I have 
since interviewed have claimed that the fact 
they and their children were allowed to vote was 
indicative of just how “fair” and “democratic” 
the election actually was.
Voting in 2003 also differed from voting in 
both the 1997 and 2002 elections in that votes 
were not cast prior to polling. I did not uncover 
a single case of block voting prior to the polls. 
Nor did I interview anyone who claimed to 
have been pressured or coerced into giving their 
vote to a particular candidate. To the contrary, 
everyone I interviewed claimed to have voted 
for the candidate of their choice, and the vast 
majority of people at Kopiago insisted that the 
elections had been both free and fair. 
THE RESULTS
The official election results are shown below. 
They reveal that the two Duna candidates ran 
first and second. 
Although the election result was to be 
expected, there are certainly some irregularities 
and anomalies that beg consideration. Firstly, 
the two Duna candidates between them picked 
up two thirds (66%) of the actual votes cast, 
despite the fact that Duna make up only 37% 
of the electorate. This indicates that the 
Duna candidates picked up many Huli votes. 
The actual ballot box counts obtained by Bill 
Standish reveal that Petrus and Ben both picked 
up large numbers of Huli votes. In Ben’s case 
this had much to do, I believe, with the fact 
that he ran on a United Resources Party ticket, 
was endorsed by Anderson Agiru and backed 
Table 1. The 2003 Koroba – Lake Kopiago Open Electorate Results
Candidate  Party    Votes Polled  Percent
Nane Petrus Thomas People’s Progress Party  16401    38.6% 
Benias Epe Peri  United Resources Party  11614   27.4%
Matias Olape  National Alliance Party   3730   8.8%
Herowa Urape Agiwa People’s National Congress 3292   7.8%
David Kelo Kikapu Independent   2222   5.2%
Robert Paija Tabonago Independent   1632   3.8%
Mathew Makape Timbena Independent   1164   2.7% 
John Hetawi Arabagali Independent   1020   2.4%
Ben Maui Mindiria Hela Independent   819   1.9%
Joe Kayuria Mindi Independent   557   1.3%
Anderson Andalu Wapiria  Papua & Niugini Union Pati 10   0.0%
Steven Mokola  Independent   1   0.0%
 
Total Ballots Allowed     42462
Informal       133
Total       42595
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by the Hela province movement. Petrus, by 
contrast, picked up the votes of disgruntled 
and marginalised Hulis – people who are now 
choosing to emphasise their Duna connections 
over their Huli ones. His Huli votes came 
primarily from bi-lingual census units.
The Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open Electorate 
comprises four LLG: North Koroba and South 
Koroba which are ethnically Huli; and Lake 
Kopiago and Auwi/Logaiyu in which the Duna 
predominate. About 60% of the electorate’s 
population resides in the North and South 
Koroba areas. In the 2003 elections the ballot 
boxes (48 in all) for these areas were counted 
first. They contained some 16385 ballot papers. 
The true population of the North and South 
Koroba LLGs is in the order of 26-28000 people, 
so there certainly were not vast numbers extra 
votes counted. After the North and South 
Koroba boxes were counted Fr Mattius Olape 
was leading the poll with 3657 votes. In second 
place was the outgoing member Herowa Agiwa 
who had secured 3267 votes. The two Duna 
candidates were sitting in fifth and seventh 
place with Ben Peri holding 1452 votes and 
Petrus Thomas holding 1039 votes. 
Based on the actual population of the Lake 
Kopiago and Auwi/Logaiyu areas the remaining 
ballot boxes should have contained about 
10,000 votes, which would have been shared 
between Ben Peri and Petrus Thomas, allowing 
one or both of them to legitimately leap ahead 
of the Huli candidates. As it turns out, the 
remaining 32 ballot boxes contained 25,760 
ballot papers which is more than the total Duna 
population, indicating large scale electoral 
malpractice. In total, 15,956 votes were cast 
in the Kopiago area and 10,204 in the Auwi/
Logaiyu area. Based on the actual population, 
approximately 6000 and 4000 votes should 
have been cast in each area. Evidently the scale 
of the electoral fraud perpetrated was roughly 
equivalent in each area and cannot be attributed 
to the supporters of a single candidate.
Apart from the fact that thousands of extra 
votes were cast, the ballot box counts for Lake 
Kopiago reveal no major irregularities. To the 
contrary, they suggest individual voters were 
able to vote for the candidate of their choice. 
A consideration of the individual ballot box 
counts reveals that the Duna, Hewa and Bogaia 
votes cast at polling places within the Lake 
Kopiago LLG were split fairly evenly between 
Ben Peri and Petros Thomas, with Ben picking 
up 8031 votes and Petros picking up 7608 votes. 
This was to be expected given that there were 
only two Duna candidates and they were both 
from Kopiago. For instance, of the 596 votes 
cast in the Kopiago Station ballot box 281 went 
to Petrus Thomas, whereas 312 went to Ben 
Peri. At Yokona 183 votes went to Petrus and 
139 to Ben. These examples are indicative of 
voting throughout Lake Kopiago LLG. 
Of the Lake Kopiago ballot boxes only 3 
proved anomalous, in that the votes were not 
split, although there are reasonable explanations 
in each case. Wagia/Pongolaia for instance is 
where Petrus’ father is from. At that particular 
polling place Petrus gained 304 of the 349 
votes cast. At Hirane, by contrast, Ben gained 
1122 of the 1161 votes cast. Ben’s father was 
the councillor for Hirane/Mbara for many years 
and Hirane is the home to Ben’s most avid 
supporters. At Aiyuguni however, Petrus gained 
1147 votes as opposed to Ben’s 215. Petrus’ 
mother is an active member of the Aiyuguni 
community and Aiyuguni is the home to several 
of the men who directed Petrus’ campaign. 
It should be noted, though, that the resident 
population of each council ward, including 
children, is only about 500 so at the Aiyuguni 
and Hirane polling places more than four times 
as many votes were cast as should have been, 
again indicating that the supporters of both 
candidates sought to steal the election.
Voting in the Auwi/Logaiyu area proved 
very different to that in the Kopiago area. Petrus 
Thomas gained the majority of the votes – 7754 
of the 10204 votes cast. Ben, by contrast, only 
obtained 2133 votes. This in itself was not 
surprising. In 1992 and 1997, Matthew Magaye 
collected nearly all the Auwi/Logaiyu votes. In 
2003, he stood down in favour Petrus Thomas 
and campaigned on Petrus’s behalf. Everyone I 
spoke to expected Petrus to collect the majority 
of the Auwi/Logaiyu votes and that is what 
transpired. 
In the tally room, several of the Auwi/
Logaiyu boxes were disputed (pers.com. Bill 
Standish 2003). Ben Peri and his supporters 
did not want these boxes counted and alleged 
that they had been tampered with. Given that 
Matthew Magaye who outpolled Ben in the 
previous two elections had actively supported 
Petrus Thomas, Ben and his supporters would 
have known that the majority of Auwi/Logaiyu 
votes would have legitimately passed to Petrus, 
and for this reason they no doubt tried to stop 
the count.
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POST-ELECTION DISPUTES
Despite the discontent in the tally room, 
Petrus Thomas was declared the winner of the 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago Open Electorate on 1 
May 2003. He was sworn in to parliament a 
week or so later. Within days of the result being 
announced, Ben Peri filed an appeal with the 
National Court disputing the election result. 
The appeal is still pending.
For the majority of people at Kopiago 
the declaration brought jubilation. For the 
most part, even those who voted for Ben Peri 
considered the outcome a good one; for the 
first time in two decades a Duna candidate had 
secured the seat and everyone agreed that this 
boded well for the future. Only Ben’s most avid 
campaigners and those who had benefited from 
Anderson Agiru’s patronage disputed the result. 
Led by Nueman Pakalu, this group mobilised 
and, using threats of violence, blockaded the 
Government Station for the best part of three
 months. Only those who had voted for 
Ben were afforded safe and free travel onto the 
station. When Petrus Thomas attempted to 
visit Lake Kopiago for the swearing in of the 
Council President he was chased away by Ben’s 
supporters. Similarly, he was met with road 
blocks when he attempted to travel to Lake 
Kopiago for the Independence Day celebrations 
in September 2003.
At present (November 2003), all is quiet at 
Kopiago. Neither Ben Peri or Petrus Thomas 
have visited the area since the elections and 
most of the newly elected local government 
councillors are absent in Mendi and Hagen 
waiting to hear the outcome of Ben Peri’s 
appeal. The pending court case is attracting 
much interest.
In the six months since the 2003 
Supplementary Elections, Petrus Thomas’s 
support has continued to swell. Almost without 
exception, Duna people are disappointed that 
Ben Peri is pursuing his appeal against the 
Election result. They feel the election was fair 
and democratic as far as PNG elections go, and 
that Ben should allow Petrus to get on with the 
business of serving his people. Even many of 
those who voted for him are now charging Ben 
with blocking development by keeping Petrus 
embroiled in court disputes. They see the court 
case as vexatious and divisive, citing that Ben’s 
appeal alleges that Petrus is not Duna or from 
Kopiago – that he was not therefore residentially 
qualified to stand. Even Ben’s most ardent 
supporters acknowledge that Petrus was born 
at Kopiago, maintains a house at Aiyuguni and 
that both his parents are from and continue to 
reside within the Kopiago Basin. As the appeal 
process drags out, Ben’s support is waning. 
Several men and women who voted for Ben in 
2003 have informed me that they will not vote 
for him if a by-election takes place. They feel 
that a by-election would see Petrus returned 
with an even bigger margin, or in the event that 
Petrus was not allowed to contest it, they fear 
the seat would be returned to the Huli, to the 
detriment of the Duna people.
CONCLUSION
For people at Kopiago, Petrus’s electoral 
success is held to derive from, and at the same 
time signal, the ongoing need for Duna unity. 
By coming together and effectively preselecting 
the candidate of their choice the Duna found 
a way to legitimately overcome their electoral 
disadvantage with respect to the Huli. With 
only two Duna candidates in a field of twelve, 
it was always the case that the Huli vote would 
be spilt clearing the way for a Duna candidate to 
claim the seat. 
Doubts may certainly be cast about the 
number of votes secured by both Petrus and 
Ben, but even without the additional votes 
they would have still run first and second 
respectively. Indeed, after the North and South 
Koroba ballot boxes had been counted they were 
both within reach of the leading Huli candidate 
– Father Mattius Olape. At that point in the 
count Fr Mattius had 3657 votes, while Petros 
and Ben had 1039 and 1441 votes respectively, 
with what should have been 10,000 Duna, Hewa 
and Bogaia votes to come. Assuming that the 
Lake Kopiago votes were split between the two 
candidates and that Petrus received 75% of the 
Auwi/Logaiyu votes, Petrus would have secured 
somewhere in the order of 7000 votes while Ben 
would have gained around 5500 votes, placing 
both well ahead of Fr Mattius who in the end 
gained 3730 votes.
The implications of the 2003 Koroba-Lake 
Kopiago polls are significant for future PNG 
elections, especially in electorates which span 
ethnic or cultural groupings. To date, candidate 
numbers have increased with each national 
election meaning that candidates have been 
elected with smaller and smaller margins over 
time (Reilly 2002; May 2003b). This in turn 
has encouraged fragmentation within local 
groups and generated election related violence 
(Standish 2002a; May 2003b). In 2002, 2878 
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candidates contested the PNG National 
Elections with an average of 26 candidates per 
seat (Standish 2002a:28). Under the Limited 
Preferential Voting System however, successful 
candidates will need to rely on much larger 
support bases and will need to work together 
with other candidates (Reilly 2002:139) in order 
to secure preferences in much the same way 
as Petrus Thomas did in 2003. By preselecting 
the candidate of their choice, Duna within the 
Koroba-Lake Kopiago electorate reversed the 
nation-wide trend which has seen a proliferation 
of candidates and thereby ensured the success 
of their chosen candidate and their people. 
This election has shown that under the Limited 
Preferential Voting System language-based 
ethnicity may come to play a more significant 
role in PNG politics. The question is will this 
induce stability and make for good governance.
ENDNOTES
19 This ﬁgure and those that follow have been 
calculated from the 1990 census ﬁgures and the 
1980-1990 population growth rate of 1.9% per 
annum. They bear little resemblance to the most 
recent PNG census ﬁgures or the number of people 
listed on the Common Roll, which are both grossly 
inﬂated (see Haley 2002)
20 Although the Duna and Bogaia speaking areas of 
the Sub-District were derestricted in 1964, the 
Hewa speaking areas were not derestricted until 
1971. 
21 Such beliefs are common throughout the wider 
region. Robbins (1997:41-48), for instance, notes 
that Urapmin read moral status from the skin, 
whereas Ballard (2000:210) notes of the Huli that 
“the moral order of [their] society is held to register 
on the ‘skin’ of the land.”
22 Another of the candidates contesting the Koroba-
Lake Kopiago seat publicly raised concerns that 
this “radio network” could be misused during the 
election to “exert other pressures during polling” 
(PNG Post-Courier, 7 June 2002, p.5). 
23 Extracts from this letter were published in the PNG 
Post-Courier, 14 June 2002, p.3.
24 It should be noted that all previous attempts to 
commercially grow coffee at Kopiago have failed 
due to the remoteness of the area. It is also well 
outside the altitudinal limits at which vanilla will 
bear. As proof of his claims that he would bring 
both wealth and development, Ben Peri ﬂew in 
several bags of vanilla seeds and a coffee processing 
machine supplied by his Malaysian contacts whom 
he claimed would develop the Kopiago area by 
“helping” people cut down the forest and clear new 
bush gardens to plant the coffee and vanilla.
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WHITE HORSE 27: 
THE ELECTORAL 
CAMPAIGN OF BARI 
PALMA
ABBY MCLEOD
This paper analyses the national election 
campaign of Bari Palma, a candidate in 
2002 for the Kerowagi Open electorate in 
Simbu Province. Ultimately, Bari Palma was 
unsuccessful in his bid to win the seat polling 
1839 votes, or 2.3% of the 81,107 votes cast, 
and finishing 14th in a field of 28 candidates. 
Nevertheless, Palma’s pursuit of votes in 
the general election is of interest both as a 
detailed example of one individual’s campaign 
and as a demonstration of broader trends in 
contemporary PNG politics. Dubbed “White 
Horse 27” by his people, Bari Palma – Kerowagi 
Open candidate number 27 – utilized Labour 
Party ideology to appeal to the hard working 
people of his tribe, referred to as ‘white horses’ 
on account of the heavy white coffee bags that 
they carry on their heads over rough terrain. 
At the individual level, Palma stood out for his 
strong commitment to party politics and his 
initial reluctance to participate in tribally based 
‘Highlands style’ politicking. While attempting 
to distance his campaign from local politics, 
Palma’s campaign fuelled tensions within his 
own tribe and became embroiled in the corrupt 
electoral politics that he sought to oppose. It 
thereby illustrates the pervasiveness of tribally 
based politicking and corrupt electoral practices 
in the highlands.
Despite the abundant literature on PNG 
elections, accounts of individual campaigns are 
few, with published works focusing largely upon 
national, regional, provincial and electorate 
overviews (Hegarty 1983; King 1989; Saffu 
1996; Standish 1983, 1989, 1996, 2002b) as well 
as particular issues such as violence (Dinnen 
1996, 2001), women’s participation (Sepoe 
1996, 2002) and electoral systems (Reilly 
1996). From these studies, much has been 
gleaned about prevailing trends and processes 
in PNG electoral politics, but the voices of 
those attempting to counter such trends remain 
largely silent. This paper attempts to redress 
this imbalance by describing and analysing at 
the grass-roots level an individual campaign 
which both challenges and confirms dominant 
discourses about elections in PNG. While Palma 
was ultimately unsuccessful, it is significant 
that, despite his understanding of PNG electoral 
politics, he chose to pursue his campaign in a 
manner which held little promise of reward. 
METHODOLOGY
Most of the observations upon which this 
paper is based were made during the three-weeks 
preceding the commencement of polling in 
Simbu Province and in the days after polling 
began (June 3rd- 23rd 2002). During this period, 
I spent two weeks living among members of the 
Bari tribe at Ganigle (alongside the Highlands 
Highway) and one week in ‘traditional’ Bari 
territory on the south side of the Wahgi River. 
Data was gathered primarily through participant 
observation, engaging in daily conversations 
about the impending elections, attending 
evening vigils in the local campaign house, 
holding focus groups, documenting campaign 
speeches and travelling to other places along 
the campaign trail. I also conducted two 
structured interviews with Bari Palma in order 
to gain detailed information about his political 
aspirations and campaign strategy. Back in 
Australia, I maintained weekly contact with 
Bari Palma during the counting period in order 
to follow his progress and document relevant 
events. In addition to the detailed information 
gathered during the 2002 elections, while living 
among the Bari during 1999 and 2000 I learned 
much about Bari politicking, as the coming 
2002 elections were frequently discussed. It 
would be remiss not to note at the outset that 
I was previously married to Bari Palma and 
that my presence in Simbu during the elections 
inevitably influenced his campaign and my 
subsequent rendering of it. 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA ELECTIONS
Since the first national election in 1964, 
PNG elections have been keenly observed, 
documented and analysed by foreign and local 
commentators. In reflecting upon the first four 
elections, Hegarty (1983) noted that while 
secessionist movements had abated by 1977, few 
other changes in electoral politics had occurred: 
political parties remained of slight importance, 
clan mobilisation continued to be the primary 
means of obtaining candidate support and voters 
harboured ongoing expectations of material 
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gain. Similarly, in 1996, Saffu noted that, “…
despite an undoubted rapid social change over 
the period, continuity in electoral behaviour, 
rather than change, has been the more striking 
feature” (1996: 3). 
In concluding his survey of the 1992 
national elections, Saffu asserted the continuity 
of two primary features of elections in PNG: 
the relative unimportance of political parties 
and the local character of electoral politics 
(1996: 41). He argued that voter choices were 
determined primarily by the evaluation of 
candidates’ attributes, including their social 
networks and ability to deliver material rewards 
(Saffu 1996: 4-6). Some ten years later, Standish 
also noted that political parties did not play a 
significant role in the 2002 elections and that 
electoral politics continued to be local in nature 
(Standish 2002b). As argued by Standish, 
however, it no longer appears “that elections in 
Papua New Guinea continue to be free and fair” 
(Saffu 1996: 41; Standish 1996, 2002b).
The 2002 National Election was widely 
hailed as the worst election in the country’s 
history (Standish 2002b). The government’s 
plan to limit voting to one day was not realized 
in many parts of the country, the common roll 
was sullied by ghost names and the notion of a 
free and fair election became farcical in the face 
of mass vote buying, the restriction of candidate 
movement, the stealing of ballot boxes and 
voting at gunpoint. Such problems were most 
clearly manifest in the Highlands region, where 
“gunpoint democracy” (Standish 1996, 2002b) 
reigned supreme in Southern Highlands and 
Enga Provinces, but also in Western Highlands 
and Simbu Provinces. In the wake of voting, 
tribal warfare erupted throughout the region 
and the votes of Southern Highlanders in six of 
eight electorates were declared void.
In Simbu Province, the political trends 
observed by Standish (1976, 1983, 1989, 1996, 
2002b) continued, with localised campaigning, 
bloc-voting, feasting and the distribution 
of cash as the favoured methods of rallying 
support, alongside tampering with the common 
roll, vote splitting, the restriction of candidate 
campaigning and the pervasive threat of 
violence. Delays in voting were experienced 
throughout the province, ballot papers were 
stolen, police were absent from polling booths, 
counting was suspended on several occasions 
and election related violence resulted in as 
many as thirty deaths (Standish 2002b). While 
the Simbu vote was accepted as legitimate by 
the government, the electoral process was far 
from democratic. 
While 2873 candidates contested the six 
open seats of Kundiawa, Sinasina-Yonggamugl, 
Kerowagi, Gumine, Karimui and Chuave, only 
41 candidates contested the Simbu Regional 
seat. Of all Simbu candidates, only 43 were 
female, constituting a mere 1.5%. In Kerowagi 
district, 29 males contested the seat of sitting 
member John Kamb, down from 35 candidates 
in 1997, only four of whom recontested. Of 
those 29 candidates, three were from the Bari 
tribe, including Bari Palma.
CANDIDATE PROFILE
The Bari tribe (referred to by Kuman 
speakers as Bandi) of Kerowagi District 
(Kup Sub-District) has approximately 4, 000 
members, all of whom speak a dialect of Kuman 
known as Kora. The majority of Bari reside on 
the south side of the Wahgi River, sharing tribal 
boundaries with the Dom, Yuri and Endugwa 3 
(Kunanaku) tribes (see Map 1). The Bari tribe 
comprises two phratries, Bari One and Bari Two, 
which together include some 12 clans, each 
of which is further divided into sub-clans and 
men’s house groups. 
Bari Palma, otherwise known as Ignatius 
Moli Palma, is an agnate of the Nimaikane 
clan (Kulame Gauma sub-clan) and a member 
of Kumandikan men’s house (see Figure 1). 
In addition to those Bari who live south of 
the Wahgi, many Bari have migrated to areas 
alongside the Highlands Highway and to 
Kundiawa town. A large group of Nimaikane 
migrants live on land purchased from the Dage 
tribe at Ganigle, close to the Western Highlands 
border. Members of Bari Palma’s family occupy 
both ‘traditional’ Bari land alongside the Wahgi 
and new land at Ganigle, thus he has strong 
support in both areas.
As a child, Palma benefited from the 
strong emphasis that his mother, Bari Tine 
(now deceased), and father, Moli Tetor, placed 
upon education. Palma’s school fees were met 
largely by his father’s coffee plantation wages 
which enabled him to attend Kulame primary 
school and Kondiu Rosary Secondary School. 
His excellence at school was rewarded with a 
scholarship to complete his senior schooling 
at Kerevat National High School and he later 
undertook odd jobs in Australia to support 
himself while undertaking a Bachelor of 
Business at the Queensland University of 
Technology. Upon receiving his degree in 1998, 
Palma returned to PNG where he worked with 
the Investment Promotion Authority in Port 
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MAP 1: BARI TERRITORY 
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Figure 1 – Bari tribal structure (with clan level detail for Nimaikane)
Moresby. In 1999, he accompanied me to Simbu 
to help me with my fieldwork and develop 
his family’s coffee holdings. In mid-2000, he 
returned to Port Moresby where he operated a 
security business before moving to Goroka to 
try to forge business links with Australian coffee 
exporters.
At the time of the 2002 elections, Palma was 
approximately 30 years of age. He was divorced, 
but it was popularly believed that he was still 
married, a belief that was easily sustained by 
the fact that it is not uncommon for Simbu 
husbands and wives to live apart while one 
partner works in another region or country. As 
having an expatriate wife both demonstrated 
and elevated Palma’s social status, it was in his 
strategic interests not to reveal his divorce and 
he did not do so. Palma had strong support from 
both his immediate family and men’s house 
group, and significant financial support from his 
adoptive mother who was the primary sponsor of 
his campaign. In addition to the support of kin, 
Palma formed a small campaign team of four 
men, all of whom were chosen for their public 
speaking abilities, their popularity and their 
previous campaign experience. 
In an interview about his desire to become a 
member of parliament, Palma claimed that his 
primary motivation was to bring services such as 
roads, housing schemes and basic development 
to his people. On a personal level, he said he 
wanted to utilise the power and money that 
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he would gain as a politician to create business 
opportunities and build himself a permanent 
home in his natal village. Palma identified 
his main weakness as a candidate as a lack of 
funds but he claimed that his strengths were 
his education, his genuine love for his people 
and his strong commitment to fighting for their 
rights.
CAMPAIGNING
Bari Palma’s campaign officially commenced 
in late September 2001 when campaign 
houses were built at Ganigle and Kumandikan 
village. During this period, Palma resided in 
Port Moresby, attempting to raise funds for 
his campaign. After lodging his nomination 
fee and announcing his candidature with the 
PNG Labour Party in April 2002, Palma went 
to Brisbane to try to secure funds from the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP). While he did not 
receive any money, the ALP generously printed 
Palma’s campaign posters and stickers. Upon 
returning to Simbu, Palma undertook two weeks 
of intensive daytime campaigning, delivering 
campaign speeches in markets and other public 
places throughout Kerowagi District.
From this point onwards, ably assisted by 
his campaign team, Palma campaigned during 
the evenings at men’s houses throughout the 
district. Palma was typically accompanied by 
numerous young Nimaikane men and women, 
most of whom walked, while Palma and his 
men travelled in a small Suzuki that they had 
borrowed for the campaign. While Palma 
forbade the killing of pigs early in his campaign, 
at many men’s houses Palma arrived to find that 
a pig had been killed or that lamb flaps were 
cooking. On all occasions, Palma took with 
him tea and coffee supplies, and occasionally 
lamb flaps. In addition to travelling to other 
areas, invited guests travelled to Ganigle to 
hear Palma’s campaign. On these occasions, 
Nimaikane women sat through the night 
providing tea, coffee and sweet potato, and 
entertaining guests with campaign songs which 
extolled the virtues of Bari Palma (McLeod 
2002).
In the weeks immediately before the 
election, daily Simbu life was taken over by 
election mania; Kundiawa was transformed 
by posters and public rallies, utility vehicles 
traversed the Highway carrying supporters 
broadcasting or singing campaign songs over 
megaphones, people donned ‘traditional’ finery 
and danced in public spaces, and the haunting 
sounds of men crying ‘poo oh’ (a traditional call 
known as kaman kaku sungo) echoed throughout 
the valleys. Despite much underlying tension 
and suspicion, the pre-voting period was largely 
festive, with people sitting ‘6 to 6’ (a local 
expression for ‘all night’) in campaign houses 
discussing strategies, singing campaign songs 
and discussing the opportunities that they would 
gain should their chosen candidate win. 
Of the 29 candidates for Kerowagi Open, 
the three men from the Bari tribe were Bari 
Palma (PNG Labour Party), Manfred Sipai 
Kale Nolkua (Independent) and Nobert Alua 
Ole (People’s National Congress Party). Both 
Palma and Ole had announced their intention 
to stand for the 2002 elections in 1998, sparking 
four years of protracted debate between the 
two men and their respective sub-clan groups. 
The political aspirations of Nolkua, however, 
were voiced only during the run-up to the 
nomination period and came as a surprise to 
many. All three men belong to the phratry Bari 
Two, with Palma and Ole being members of the 
Nimaikane clan (albeit from different sub-clans) 
and Nolkua being an Alaro Beka clansman.
While Palma and Ole had long voiced 
their political aspirations, many suggested that 
Nolkua’s nomination was lodged in an attempt 
to vote-split, that is, to limit the votes of Palma 
and Ole by expanding voter choice. Despite 
Nolkua’s claim to possess a genuine desire for 
a political career, people believed that he was 
reacting to the death of one of his clansmen, 
who was killed by a Nimaikane man during 
intra-tribal warfare in 1997. The nomination of 
three men caused great internal tension among 
the Bari tribe and elders urged the ‘brothers’ 
to co-operate, not compete. It was argued that 
one Bari representative was better than none, 
particularly since the Bari were yet to gain 
representation in parliament. Nevertheless, all 
three men remained committed to contesting 
the Kerowagi Open seat. 
Throughout the pre-election period and after 
voting, tension between the two Nimaikane 
candidates, Ole (Kawagl Gauma) and Palma 
(Kulame Gauma), was manifest in threats and 
actual incidents of violence. While my closer 
association with Palma’s people may have 
affected my interpretation of events, it did 
appear that the majority of overt antagonism 
arose from Ole’s ‘camp’. Indeed, almost daily 
meetings were held among Palma’s people, 
with elders and Palma frequently reiterating 
the need to avoid fighting. Unfortunately, a 
number of violent incidents arose, beginning 
with the firing of a ‘warning shot’ at Palma 
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during campaigning within Bari territory. The 
shooter, a leading Bari mercenary, later admitted 
to having been paid K50 by Kawagk Gauma 
tribesmen to fire the shot at Palma to restrict his 
movement during the campaign period. Over 
the following months, many physical fights 
ended in bloodshed and subsequently in small 
compensation payments. In attempts to keep 
their name clear, Kulame Gauma tribesmen 
and women reported several incidents to the 
Kerowagi police. 
During the weeks immediately before 
polling, while I was at Ganigle, Kawagk Gauma 
tribesmen frequently fired ‘warning’ shots at 
Palma’s supporters, cut down the banana trees 
of a Kulame Guama elder and threw stones 
at voters singing campaign songs in support 
of Palma. Indeed, during the closing of the 
campaign house at Ganigle, women and 
children were urged to move away from the 
celebration area as Kawagk Guama men were 
hiding close by, armed with guns, sticks and 
stones. On my final night in Simbu, a number of 
Kulame Gauma men visited the house in which 
I was sleeping, asking permission to borrow 
my host’s gun, as Kawagk Gauma men were 
preparing for warfare. 
Palma’s broad strategy was to campaign 
widely, delivering speeches in a mixture of his 
local language, Kora, and pidgin. While some 
criticized him for using pidgin, Palma told me 
that he felt limited by Kora, as he was unable 
to easily express many of the concepts that 
he wished to talk about in that language. To 
broaden his voter base, Palma tried to engage 
the support of council candidates who represent 
smaller segments of the population. Believing 
that councillors would subsequently persuade 
their people to vote for him, he urged potential 
councillors to obtain ‘labour party endorsement’. 
Palma claimed that as the Labour Party was a 
people’s party, it had to gain support from the 
bottom up, hence the importance of enlisting 
councillor support. 
Palma considered his voter base to be 
primarily Bari, Kulame Gauma sub-clan 
members living at Ganigle, members of the Dage 
clan Mulwaku and members of the Nauro tribe 
living at Bualkap on the Kundiawa/Kerowagi 
District border. In keeping with his commitment 
to break with tribally based Highlands politics, 
however, Palma campaigned widely throughout 
Kerowagi District in Sambuga, Wauga, Gena, 
Nagenku, Kunanaku, Dage and Greigu tribal 
territories. Palma justified this approach by 
claiming, “They are playing village politics 
and will only secure votes in their area. I 
am playing national politics.” This approach 
met some resistance, however, and in some 
instances, upon entering the base vote areas 
of other candidates, Palma and his supporters 
encountered road-blocks manned by men with 
guns, bush knives and stones.
While Palma certainly spoke of his personal 
attributes, his campaign speeches centred 
primarily upon his membership of the PNG 
Labour Party and his commitment to its policy. 
Palma’s posters and campaign stickers proudly 
bore the Labour Party name, an association 
that was clearly absorbed by supporters who 
incorporated Palma’s party affiliation within 
their campaign songs. In addition, Palma’s 
English language sticker, ‘Don’t let them buy 
your vote’, appeared in the most unlikely places, 
including on people’s foreheads. Although he 
received no actual financial support from the 
party, Palma argued that, unlike independent 
candidates who had limited and uncertain 
financial resources, party affiliated candidates 
had greater potential to deliver material benefits 
to their communities. 
Much of Palma’s campaigning was dedicated 
to disseminating Labour Party information, 
which he skilfully associated with local history 
and mores. For example, Palma noted the 
long history of ALP development in Australia, 
stating that ALP governments had prevailed 
throughout much of Simbu’s period of 
Australian colonization when people had access 
to education and health – a somewhat falsified 
history given the short period that the ALP was 
in power during the 1945–1974 colonial period. 
He therefore forged a link between the Labour 
Party and Simbu ancestry, utilizing phrases such 
as ‘Yumi mama papa blo labour pati’ (we are the 
mothers and fathers of the labour party) and 
‘nau Labour pati em i olsem haus man blo yumi, 
yumi no wan clan o wan tribe moa yet’ (now 
the Labour Party is like our men’s house, we are 
no longer clansmen and tribesmen). 
Subsequently, Palma emphasized the idea 
that, for government to be effective in PNG, 
it is necessary for people to vote on the basis 
of policy, rather than on the basis of tribal 
loyalty and goods received or promised. During 
interviews, Palma claimed that it was essential 
to challenge the way people vote, thus a major 
part of his campaign involved teaching people 
to vote individually, regardless of a candidate’s 
tribal affiliation. After one campaign speech 
within Bari territory, feisty debate ensued as 
people discussed how to organize their clan vote. 
While most people claimed that they would 
vote as a clan for the strongest Bari candidate, 
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others said they wanted to vote as individuals 
with free will. However, a woman who had 
travelled from Barawagi highlighted the 
difficulty faced by voters attempting to exercise 
free will. In Palma’s absence, the woman asked 
me to tell him “If police are tight, tell Palma I’ll 
vote for him, but he must understand that I am 
in John Kamb’s base and it will be hard if there 
are no police”.
Unlike other candidates, Palma did not 
challenge the claims of individual candidates 
during campaign speeches, but he utilized the 
corruption of various People’s Democratic 
Movement (PDM) candidates and ex-
parliamentary members to bolster the image of 
the Labour Party. In comparing the two parties, 
Palma used the renowned corruption of Pias 
Wingti and the locally rumoured corruption of 
sitting member John Kamb to typify PDM as 
a capitalist party committed to the interests of 
the elite. In contrast to PDM, he outlined the 
working class roots of the Labour Party, arguing 
that it was a party committed to the needs of 
the grass roots population and to the abolition 
of corruption. 
In his attempt to forge an association 
between the ‘working class roots’ of the PNG 
Labour Party and the ‘grass roots’ existence 
of the Bari, Palma emphasized the relative 
lack of development in their area. Historical 
antecedents of this sentiment may be traced 
back as far as the 1940s when Patrol Officers 
noted that the tribes to the south of the Wahgi 
were underdeveloped (Downs 1940) and to the 
1960s when Bari attempted to join Kundiawa 
District. Throughout the election period, group 
sentiments of neglect were voiced in election 
songs, one of which commented on the fact 
that other candidates travelled in expensive cars 
while another likened the Bari to ‘white horses’. 
Palma said the Labour Party could provide a 
solution to the problems of the Bari and that as 
grass roots people they would be understood and 
represented by the Labour Party. 
Throughout his speeches, Palma claimed 
to be one of the founding fathers of the PNG 
Labour Party, noting that he had sat with the 
leader, John Paska, during the drafting of the 
party’s policy and that he had consorted with 
ALP officials in Australia. In order to assert the 
strength of his candidacy, Palma emphasized 
a number of aspects of his own personal 
history and experience. First, he asserted that 
while he was a highly educated man who had 
travelled widely, he had grown up in Simbu, 
understood his people and was committed 
to their wellbeing. Second, he highlighted 
his educational and occupational record, 
emphasizing his Australian higher education, 
the fact that his degree was in international 
business and his experience in working with 
the Investment Promotion Authority. These 
characteristics, he claimed, were fundamental 
requirements for modern parliamentarians, 
who have the responsibility of improving the 
country’s economy and developing positive 
relationships with dignitaries from the English-
speaking world. Unlike many candidates, Palma 
did not draw heavily upon Christian rhetoric or 
his Catholic background, though he said that 
‘God bai tokim yu husait bai win, na em bai blesim 
yu sapos yu putim rait man igo insait’ (God will 
tell you who will win and he will bless you if 
you put the right man in parliament).
Palma’s association with Australia formed a 
key aspect of his campaign, an association that 
was inevitably lent credence by my presence 
in Simbu during the election. Not only did 
he claim an ability to be able to communicate 
with Australians on account of his time spent 
in that country, but he also claimed that he 
was ‘opening the road’ for other Bari to go to 
Australia. This was readily absorbed by Palma’s 
supporters, many of whom told me ‘yu wet, 
taim Palma i kamap memba, mi bai go pas long 
Australia’ (you wait, when Palma becomes a 
member I’ll be the first to go to Australia). 
While he did not overtly state that he would 
fund such trips, it was certainly assumed 
that this was the case and many young men 
eagerly spoke of finding work on farms in rural 
Queensland. Despite this strong emphasis 
upon his Australian connections, Palma also 
emphasized his Bari roots, stating “I am a 
true Bari man, my name was Iggy Palma but 
I changed it to Bari Palma because I want to 
represent my people”.
Palma emphasized the existence of a written 
Labour Party policy and long-term plan, 
claiming that many other candidates lacked 
a clear policy. Palma spoke of four key issues, 
namely:
1) Free education – Palma stated that this 
was the ‘mama lo’ (mother law) of the 
Labour Party, and claimed that although 
the PDM made similar promises it had no 
long-term plan, unlike the Labour Party. 
2) Free health – According to Palma, a 
major Labour Party goal is to provide free 
hospital care and fully functioning free 
Aid Posts.
3) Improved living – Palma claimed that 
the Labour Party strives to assist people 
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in developing permanent housing, proper 
toilets, easy water access and improved 
roads by 2015. Here he played particularly 
to the female vote by emphasizing the 
hard work of women who walk long 
distances to get water and who cook on 
the ground.
4) Import substitution – Palma drew 
upon his experience at the Investment 
Promotion Authority to emphasize the 
need to substitute expensive imports 
with locally produced goods. He noted 
the rising cost of imported rice and the 
ease with which rice can be produced 
locally, as has recently begun at Kondiu 
Secondary School.
People seemed rather taken with Palma’s 
‘party message’ and appeared to forge a sense of 
group identity as newly incorporated members of 
the Labour Party. This sentiment was manifest 
in the various songs composed about the virtues 
of the Labour Party and in frequent comments 
such as ‘yumi ol mama papa blo Labour Pati’ 
(we are the mothers and fathers of the Labour 
Party). Party politics, as explained by Palma, was 
contrasted with ‘Highlands style’ vote buying 
and one man told me ‘The real meaning of the 
word politics is lie. Palma isn’t doing politics, 
he’s just telling us about his policies. There are 
no lies in the Labour Party.’ However, despite 
the overt curiosity in, and support for, the 
notion of ‘party politics’, entrenched practices 
are hard to challenge, as evidenced by an elderly 
man’s jovial yet serious comment: ‘Palma, your 
politics are good, but the other man gave me 
beer and my stomach is full!’ 
While Palma’s campaign was comparatively 
inexpensive, his primary sponsor told me 
that she spent K11, 000 (c. AUD $ 4300) 
on campaign costs such as lamb flaps (an 
imported meat product that is widely consumed 
in PNG), tea, coffee, milk, sugar, petrol, 
kerosene and small payments to his campaign 
team, in addition to lending him K4, 000 for 
other campaign related expenses. As well as 
the money spent by his sponsor, Palma used 
approximately K6000 of his own funds. In 
breaking with the Highlands tradition of vote 
buying, however, Palma offered neither pigs nor 
money to potential voters. When asked why, 
Palma said:
I am moving in a different direction. I think 
that we are moving into a new century and a 
lot of educated people are starting to realise 
that buying votes is corruption at the campaign 
level, which goes all the way to the national 
parliament and to all levels of government 
and organizations. So I stop it here, during the 
campaign. I’m getting the message clear to the 
people.
Despite his strong anti-corruption stance, 
Palma and his close supporters told me that, 
in Simbu, clean candidates do not win and 
that on this basis some minor infringements of 
democratic procedure were warranted. Many 
were carried out by Palma’s supporters and were 
not endorsed by Palma himself. A major effort 
to assist Palma’s campaign was made by a close 
agnate who enrolled to work on the census so 
that he could enlarge Palma’s base vote. He told 
me that he achieved this by adding the names 
of multiple wives for each registered male, by 
adding false names and by registering names 
at more than one location. In this fashion, he 
claims to have doubled Palma’s base vote. This 
was confirmed by one young male, who told me 
that his name was registered at Kumandikan 
village in traditional Bari territory, at Ganigle 
and also at Mulwaku. He then stated that he 
and many other young men planned to vote 
first at Kumandikan, after which they would run 
to Ganigle in order to vote again. Despite the 
falsification of the common roll, many people 
complained that their names weren’t on the roll 
– an ironic twist given that for approximately 
4, 000 Bari, 5, 600 Bari names were recorded on 
the common roll.
Behind the scenes, Palma’s key supporters 
tried to secure deals with other candidates, a 
move that became increasingly necessary as 
other candidates threatened Palma’s base vote. 
Three key attempts were made. First, after 
receiving a leg of pig, a candidate with a small 
base vote agreed to give his votes to Palma if 
he wasn’t doing well. Second, after receiving 
the backside of a pig, a candidate agreed to 
interrupt the movement of a primary competitor 
and subsequently split his base vote. Third, a 
regional candidate was asked to convince his 
supporters to give their open vote to Palma, if 
Palma would also convince his supporters to 
give their regional vote to that candidate. 
In the final days before Thursday 20 June, 
the designated polling day for Simbu, Palma 
and his people held minor feasts in order to 
celebrate and bless the closing of his campaign 
houses at Ganigle and Kumandikan. As Palma 
had expressly requested that no pigs be killed 
in relation to his campaign, the closing of the 
campaign houses provoked vigorous debate 
among his near kin. Palma resisted the killing 
of pigs mainly to avoid future debts, but also to 
emphasize the message that voting was about 
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policy, not material gain. Nimaikane elders, 
however, claimed that since independence pigs 
had been killed during political campaigns and 
that to break with tradition would cause bad 
lack. Furthermore, they stated that many of 
Palma’s avowed supporters wanted to kill pigs 
for him and that to deny them their right to 
do so would cause offence and ill will. On this 
basis, Palma allowed the campaign houses to be 
closed with small celebrations. 
On Friday 14  June, the closing of Palma’s 
campaign houses began at Ganigle. Mulwaku 
clansmen (Dage tribe) killed nine pigs and 
one goat, with 11 pigs being killed by Bari 
tribesmen. In typical Simbu fashion, Nimaikane 
elders and younger men directly associated with 
Palma’s campaign gave public speeches before 
77 neatly arranged piles of pig, sugar cane, 
bananas, cooked root crops and greens were 
distributed to designated guests. The majority 
of guests were from the Bari and Dage tribes, 
but guests from other tribes including Kumai, 
Gena and Sambuga also attended. Following the 
distribution, much dissatisfaction ensued over 
recipient choices, as many people felt that they 
had supported Palma yet received inadequate 
recognition. This was quickly rectified as 
Palma’s close family members sacrificed their 
food in order to satiate the dissatisfaction of 
outside voters. A particularly unusual feature of 
the distribution was the significant distribution 
of meat to young, rather than old, men. Upon 
noting this change from the usual norms of 
Simbu meat distribution, I asked an old lady 
what was happening, to which she replied: 
“We’re giving meat to the young men because 
if police presence isn’t strong they’ll mark all of 
the ballot papers and use force if necessary.”
Five days later, on Wednesday 19 June, the 
Kumandikan campaign house was closed with a 
celebration attended primarily by Bari tribesmen 
and women. On this occasion, some 20 pigs 
were killed, most of which were given by Bari. 
In addition, five cartons of lamb flaps were 
cooked and distributed. No arguments followed 
the distribution of food. In fact, as many guests 
later suffered from diarrhoea and people were 
unable to eat the large portions of food that 
they had received, it was believed there was 
an overabundance of food symbolizing excess 
wealth and hence indicating Palma’s success in 
the elections. While Palma remained optimistic 
about his chances of winning, he realistically 
noted that he faced significant competition 
from the sitting member, John Kamb, who had 
apparently spent a large amount of money on 
his campaign, and from Alphonse Morial Willie 
and Tom Kulag, both of whom had large tribal 
support bases with the Gena and Dage tribes 
respectively. Despite Palma’s pragmatism, spirits 
ran high in anticipation of voting the following 
day and both adults and youth danced through 
the night to the sounds of PNG reggae. 
VOTING
On Thursday 20 June, polling commenced 
in Simbu. Despite incessant rain and pervasive 
low cloud, the Bari maintained confidence 
in the government’s commitment to one-day 
polling and spent the entire day awaiting the 
arrival of their ballot boxes by helicopter. On 
that evening, news came from Bualkap that an 
anticipated 1, 008 votes for Bari Palma had been 
lost because that the rest house at which people 
were supposed to vote was not registered. This 
dampened people’s spirits, as did the fact that 
the pig meat put aside the previous day for the 
polling officers had begun to rot. 
On Friday 21 June, the rain stopped and, 
upon hearing that people had voted elsewhere 
in Simbu, the Bari ignored the local prophet’s 
claim that voting would not occur until the 
following week and idly passed another day 
anticipating the arrival of their ballot boxes. 
On Saturday, frustrations began to run high 
as people started to suspect that something 
was amiss, or rather, that a Nimaikane man 
had been successful in his attempt to bribe a 
pilot to divert his helicopter and prevent other 
Bari clans from voting for Ole and Nolkua. 
Apparently, there was only one helicopter 
in operation. On Saturday afternoon, Palma 
discussed the option of going to the Kerowagi 
Police Station with Nolkua’s supporters to 
obtain the ballot boxes, but they failed to 
reach an agreement. At this point, we began 
the journey by foot to Mingendi, passing 
through the territory of rival candidates with 
no ill consequence. Upon catching a bus from 
Mingendi to Ganigle, we heard of several 
alarming events that had transpired during 
voting in Ganigle and consequently spent the 
evening trying to devise a plan of action.
That evening we learnt the details of three 
events, none of which would work in Palma’s 
favour. The first event involved voting at 
the Moruma rest house to which Nimaikane 
men and women from both Kulame Gauma 
(Palma) and Kawagk Gauma (Ole) belong. 
Apparently, there were no police present at 
the polling booths. 1700 ballot papers were 
issued to Moruma One  rest house, when the 
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real population of the rest house was about 500 
people, around 300 being Kawagk Gauma and 
200 being Kulame Gauma sub-clan members. 
Supporters of Ole arrived heavily armed with 
semi-automatic weapons and took charge of the 
polling. The number of young Kawagk Gauma 
men at this rest house significantly outnumbered 
the number of young Kulame Gauma men 
who therefore felt that they had no choice 
but to comply. The armed Kawagk Gauma 
men gave 200 ballot papers to the people of 
Kulame Gauma, all of which were then marked 
in Palma’s name, while the remaining 1500 
papers were marked in Ole’s name. The earlier 
agreement between Kawagk Gauma and Kulame 
Gauma men that the ballot papers be evenly 
divided between Palma and Ole had been 
broken and cost Palma an anticipated 550 votes.
In addition, Palma lost a significant amount 
of anticipated votes from Ganigle rest house, 
particularly those of the Mulwaku clan (Dage 
Yogmbo tribe). Two ballot boxes designated for 
the Mulwaku clan were diverted by another 
non-Bari candidate whose supporters marked 
the ballot papers in his name. While Mulwaku 
clansmen went to Kerowagi and demanded 
ballot papers to make up for those stolen from 
them, they were given only 300 papers which 
they marked in Palma’s name. The anticipated 
number of votes from this rest house however, 
was approximately 2000. In addition, at 
Kunabau rest house, where Palma had been 
promised approximately 1000 votes, he received 
only 30–40 votes, as the local candidate and 
his armed supporters had been at the polling 
booth. Unfortunately, people’s newly gained 
commitment to Palma and the ‘party’ was 
subsumed by enforced tribal allegiance and foul 
play. 
On Sunday, having spent the entire night 
planning the rectification of Palma’s failing 
situation, we left Ganigle for Kerowagi at 
around 5:30am. Upon arrival, Palma learned 
that the ballot papers for Bari One had already 
been released. He did, however, retrieve the 
ballot papers for Bari Two, which he took in the 
car to the border of Bari territory, accompanied 
by a presiding officer. With the presiding officer 
and a number of supporters Palma then went 
towards the rest houses at which Bari Two 
members were to lodge their votes. Before 
reaching the rest houses, however, Palma and 
his companions were held at gunpoint by the 
supporters of another Bari candidate and only 
a small number of ballot papers was allocated 
to Palma. Once again, Palma fell victim to 
gunpoint democracy.
RESULTS
After repeated delays in the counting of 
votes for Simbu Province, Simbu seats were 
declared between 23 and 26 July. While sitting 
member Louis Ambane regained the Simbu 
Provincial seat, all the sitting members for 
the open electorates failed to be re-elected. In 
Kerowagi Open John Kamb ran a close second 
to Alphonse Morial Willie, who won with 
16.1%. Of the seven Simbu seats (including the 
Provincial seat), three were gained by members 
of the National Alliance (Provincial, Kerowagi, 
Sinasina-Yonggamugl), one by a People’s 
Democratic Movement (PDM) party member 
(Kundiawa), one by a National Transformation 
Party member (Chuave), and two by 
independents (Gumine and Karimui-Nomane).
Of the twenty-nine contenders for the 
Kerowagi Open seat, the three Bari candidates 
did not fare especially well, though they did 
not do badly either. Manfred Sipai Kale Nolkua 
achieved the highest result, coming sixth with 
4.8%, while Nobet Alua Ole came eleventh 
with 2.9%. Palma closely followed his clan 
brother, Nobet, with 2.3%, relegating him to 
fourteenth position. Palma’s plans for a Labour 
government were far from realised, with only 
one PNG Labour Party candidate (Western 
Province Provincial) being successful in the 
entire country.  
While the declared results clearly highlight 
Palma’s defeat, the daily readings of the results 
as they were declared provide more detailed 
insights into Palma’s successes and failures. 
Throughout the counting period in Simbu, on 
a daily basis, I observed the results mounted 
as they were mounted on the internet and 
maintained contact with Palma who was staying 
in Kundiawa in order to monitor the count. 
When votes appeared besides Palma’s name, 
I was able to confer with him to ascertain 
where they had come from, on the basis of his 
knowledge of which boxes were being counted 
each day. Significantly, at least half of Palma’s 
1839 votes were obtained from rest houses that 
Palma did not consider part of his base vote. 
Conversely, few came from members of his own 
tribe, Bari, because they were stolen by a more 
successful Bari candidate. Given that Palma 
distributed neither cash nor material goods, it 
can be reasonably concluded that votes for him 
from the members of other tribes (particularly 
those boasting their own candidates) were in 
part cast on the basis of Palma’s proclaimed 
policies.
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DISCUSSION
In situating Bari Palma’s 2002 election 
campaign within the broader context of PNG 
electoral politics, both unique and commonplace 
characteristics are revealed. Palma’s candidate 
profile, his campaign and voting in his area, 
confirm and challenge dominant discourses 
about electoral politics in PNG. Unfortunately, 
because of the lag in the publication of materials 
about the elections, the most comprehensive 
data relates to the 1992 elections (Saffu 1996).
A comparison of Palma’s candidate profile 
with the demographic characteristics of 1992 
National Election candidates, reveals that 
Palma’s biographical details both conform with 
and deviate from the average demographic 
of PNG’s emergent political elite (Saffu 
1996). Palma is male and like the majority of 
candidates he occupies the 30-39 year old age 
bracket (Saffu 1996: 12-13), albeit at the lower 
end, thus rendering him a relatively young 
candidate. Unlike most other candidates (94% 
in 1992), however, Palma was not married at the 
time of the election, nor did he have children 
(Saffu 1996: 15). As previously mentioned, 
while it was commonly believed that Palma was 
still married at this time, the most significant 
consideration regarding the marital status 
of candidates is presumably the presence or 
absence of affinal networks (and hence a 
broadened support base) which were in any case 
absent given Palma’s marriage to a non-Papua 
New Guinean. 
Like other candidates (64.9% in 1992), 
Palma claims to attend church at least once 
a week (Saffu 1996: 16) and his educational 
attainments are consistent with the increasingly 
educated nature of the emergent political 
elite. Interestingly, while voters told me that 
they have always placed an emphasis upon 
the importance of educational achievements, 
in 2002 they appeared to have raised their 
expectations to include an interest in the 
relevance of each candidate’s disciplinary 
background to the pursuit of politics.  In this 
respect, Palma’s background in international 
business was seen to be more relevant to politics 
than a competitor’s PhD in the biological 
sciences.   
Unlike his candidate profile, Palma’s 
campaign strategies contrasted greatly with 
those of his competitors. From the outset, he 
spoke against vote buying and campaigned 
beyond his immediate base vote areas. Most 
obviously, Palma’s strong emphasis upon party 
alliance and his strategic integration of Labour 
Party and local history set him apart from 
other candidates who relied primarily upon 
self-promotion. Palma avoided immediate vote 
buying, but like others he made promises of 
future material reward, albeit by evoking the 
ability of parties to deliver greater material 
rewards than individuals. 
In comparison to many other campaigners, 
Palma employed a somewhat didactic approach, 
drawing upon his understanding of politics, 
business and development to highlight his 
ability to contribute to long-term national level 
change for all Papua New Guineans, as opposed 
to short-term material gain for his immediate 
kin only. In addition, in acknowledging the 
cleavage between individual and group rights 
and obligations, Palma conducted voter 
education, drawing a strong correlation between 
the secret individual ballot and the flowering 
of democracy and subsequently of social and 
economic gains.
Ultimately, while Palma strove to make a 
clean break from the traditional style of politics, 
as voting preceded it became clear that the 
strategies that he had chosen were not winning 
strategies in the social context in which he 
was operating. Consequently, despite having 
commenced his campaign with strategies that 
distinguished him from other candidates, Palma 
came under increasing pressure to make deals 
that were undemocratic and significantly at odds 
with the ideology to which, I believe, he was 
genuinely committed. 
Despite professing an allegiance to Palma, 
voters both within and beyond his base vote 
areas conceded to the pressures of ‘gunpoint 
democracy’ and cast their votes to other 
candidates. Upon the completion of voting, 
many supporters expressed sorrow at having 
been forced at gunpoint to vote for other 
candidates and felt that they had failed Palma. 
Conversely, Palma’s supporters voiced pride in 
the non-corrupt nature of his campaign and 
praised him for “running a clean race”. 
Elderly people, in particular, noted that in 
previous times, clansmen and sub-clansmen 
supported one another, relating the fact that 
two men from one clan (Nimaikane) and three 
men from one tribe (Bari) had contested the 
election to the breakdown of group solidarity 
and the development of fighting within the 
tribe. While they did not directly correlate 
the rise of capitalism and individualism with 
this change, they did note that there is an 
increased tendency among young men to aspire 
to leadership and its attendant power, factors 
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that they believe impede group solidarity. 
Fortunately, despite obvious tensions between 
the three candidates, Bari animosities did not 
escalate into full-scale warfare and the death 
of tribesmen, as in other areas. However, these 
animosities inevitably ingrained tensions 
existing between the small social groups to 
which each man belongs.
CONCLUSIONS   
In examining the election campaign of Bari 
Palma, I have sought to provide insights into 
the dynamics of campaigning at the grassroots 
level. Furthermore, I have attempted to provide 
an alternative to the perspective that inevitably 
arises when similarities and differences between 
candidates are compressed into typologies of 
candidates, campaign strategies and voting 
behaviours. Much of the foregoing analysis 
confirms that many of the characterizations 
made by political scientists since independence 
are still applicable. In addition, however, it 
attests that a “new breed” of leaders in PNG 
is attempting to affect social change via 
Western democratic procedures from within an 
environment in which “traditional” modes of 
power broking (via the distribution of wealth) 
continue alongside the increased use of firearms 
and voter intimidation.
Bari Palma’s campaign is testament to 
this change, providing both insights into the 
existence of forward-thinking youthful leaders 
and the resilience of Papua New Guinean 
political traditions. While truth remains in 
the statement that “continuity in electoral 
behaviour, rather than change, has been the 
more striking feature” (Saffu 1996: 3), the 
voice of Bari Palma (and presumably those of 
others) suggests that, while changes in political 
behaviours may not yet be systematically 
occurring, a small number of Papua New 
Guineans are attempting to challenge dominant 
trends in the struggle for a more socially and 
economically prosperous PNG. Ultimately, 
one can predict that the demise of ‘gunpoint 
democracy’ and the emergence of ‘free and fair 
elections’ will take years to achieve, if at all. 
It is comforting, however, to recognize that 
despite prevailing political trends, young Papua 
New Guineans are seeking alternative pathways 
to power in which corruption, dishonesty and 
violence have little place. 
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